





























Hakin9 Media Sp. z o.o. 
02-676 Warszawa  
ul. Postępu 17D   
Phone: 1 917 338 3631 
www.eforensicsmag.com
All trademarks, trade names, or logos mentioned or used are the property of their respective owners.
The techniques described in our articles may only be used in private, local networks. The editors hold no responsibility for misuse of the 
presented techniques or consequent data loss.
word from the team
Dear Readers,
Let’s kick ransomware out of our lives in 2019! We’re extremely proud to 
present the the first issue of eForensics Magazine of this year - Ransomware 
attacks and investigations.
In this publication you can find an amazing article “Ransomware in insurance 
claims” by Alistair Ewing and Jason Bergson, a paper about Frogo 
ransomware memory analysis (prepared for you by Paulo Henrique Pereira, 
the instructor from eForensics’ course - Ransomware Forensics), and some 
tips for Ransomware Investigations and Incident Response, written by John 
Fokker from McAfee.
In addition to this you’ll want to check out “Obtaining your Certified Forensic 
Computer Examiner Certification - Tips and Tricks” by Matt Beers. Our 
reviewers said that after reading it they felt like going to register for the 
exams immediately. I’m sure you will have the same feeling! Also, we have 
for you articles about malicious mail attachments, Windows Live Forensics, 
Amazon Echo Forensics, a forensic analysis of the Electronic Point Record 
System and still… that’s not all!
In this issue we also present a part of our course Digital Visual Media Anti–
Forensics and Counter Anti–Forensics - in which you can learn about active 
non-blind tamper detection solutions.Thanks to all authors, reviewers and 
proofreaders for participating in this project. 
Have a nice read!
Regards,
Dominika Zdrodowska




and Incident Response tips
Intro
It was at the end of 2018 when I sat down to write this article on Ransomware, and I can’t help to think 
about “Operation Bakovia1” that took place exactly one year earlier in Romania. Operation Bakovia was 
the arrest of individuals responsible for spreading CTB-Locker Ransomware. Please enjoy this article 
where I share some personal experiences from real ransomware investigations and share forensic and 
prevention tips when faced with ransomware. 
CTB-Locker – Operation Bakovia
CTB-locker (Curve-Tor-Bitcoin) was one of the most prolific ransomware families that reigned from 2014 
till 2016. CTB-locker made victims across the globe but was mostly targeted at western countries where 
victims could more likely afford to pay the ransom. 
CTB-locker was offered through an affiliate model, this means that the developers sold the ransomware 
to partners, known as affiliates, who were responsible for spreading the ransomware. The affiliates, in 
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return, had to share a percentage of their received ransoms with the developers. By using this model, 
the developers minimized their own risk of prosecution and at the same time offered a cyber-criminal 
career opportunity to less technical hackers, or botnet herders. 
In 2016, the Netherlands was struck by a large spam campaign that impersonated one of the largest 
Telco providers. The spam mails included an invoice as attachment and were signed by an executive 
that actually worked at the Telco provider but in a different department. Obviously, the mails didn’t 
include a real invoice, but in fact had the CTB-locker ransomware included. Once a victim opened the 
attachment, their computer system was encrypted and held for ransom.  
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The original advertisement for CTB-locker on zloy(.)bz underground forum
Mid 2016 the Dutch National High-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) received an anonymous tip that a certain 
server hosted in the Netherlands was sending out spam mails that had CTB-locker attached. At that 
time, I was the technical supervisor of the team that received the information and we decided to start a 
formal investigation into CTB-locker not knowing that this investigation would lead to eastern Romania. 
The server from the anonymous tip was eventually seized and imaged for forensic examination. This 
server acted as a command and control (C2) server for a botnet from which several spam campaigns 
were launched, not only directed at the Netherlands but also Italy and the United Kingdom. Forensic 
examination of the server revealed that the criminals controlled their botnet via Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC), however they made the mistake to chat with each other via the same chat channel that controlled 
the bots, so every bot could listen in on their conversations.  Subsequently, they set up different folders 
for every spam campaign containing the fake mail body, company logos, version of CTB-locker and a 
script for spoofing the mail headers. At the time, we had requested that cyber security company 
McAfee analyze the samples we found and confirm that the viruses found were indeed CTB-locker.
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CTB-Locker Lock screen
Besides from the viruses, the spoofing script contained a major clue. The script contained a 
commented-out email address. 
Spammers often test their campaigns with an email address that is under their control, that way they 
can make sure that everything works properly before they mass mail. 
In this case, the mail address didn’t belong to an anonymous mailing service but belong to a major 
American Internet Service Company. This meant that more information on the mail account could be 
obtained by sending out a subpoena via the formal MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) process. 
Unfortunately, the MLAT process is a long one and not quite equipped to deal with today’s speed with 
which information travels. Eventually the information returned, and it proved to be full of useful 
evidence. The mail account had chatted extensively in Romanian with a co-conspirator via the Internet 
Service Company’s Chat messenger. During these chats, they spoke about a new business opportunity 
in ransomware. They have been doing other forms of cybercrime, such as phishing and SMS fraud, but 
being a partner for CTB-locker seemed pretty lucrative. 
Around the same time that the chats took place between the two, an account linked to one of the 
suspects reached out to the CTB-locker developers on the underground forum Zloy to ask if they could 
join as an affiliate. 
Additional account data obtained via the subpoena, combined with open-source research, eventually 
led to the identification of all the individuals involved and enough evidence to hand over the case to 
the Romanian authorities. This information package eventually led to the international law enforcement 
operation “Bakovia” at the end of 2017. During the operation, six locations were searched, three 
people detained, and several devices were seized.  The suspects are awaiting their trial in Romania.
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Pictures of Operation Bakovia:
Coinvault 
Coinvault was my first ransomware investigation at NHTCU. Till this day, it remains a special one, not 
because it was tremendously complicated, but it did show how the security industry and law 
enforcement can work together effectively. 
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The case started when an owner of a telco company reached out with the message that part of his 
website was hacked and that the website database was used to store almost a thousand decryption 
keys. This gave us a unique opportunity because we were able to help ransomware victims. 
By teaming up with the security industry, a decryptor for CoinVault was quickly built based on the 
keyset. This decryptor helped hundreds of victims who were able to get their files back, without paying 
the ransom. It was a great success and we felt that we had to do more… eventually this investigation 
was the start of NoMoreRansom. 
But besides helping the victims, the investigation eventually led us to the criminals behind CoinVault. A 
world first that the developers and spreaders of ransomware were caught, so how did we find the 
criminals behind CoinVault?
One of our first steps was examining the malware itself. 
The malware was coded in Microsoft’s .NET framework - this was easily determined using a tool called 
“Detect It Easy”. 
The next step was to use the Il-Spy de-compiler for .NET so see if the ransomware was easily de-
complied. This was the case and we ended up with clearly readable source-code. Most professional 
ransomware isn’t coded in .NET and easily de-compiled. Cyber-criminals do this on purpose because 
the original source code can contain a lot of forensic evidence.  
An excellent write-up on the malware analysis of CoinVault is available online and can be found here. 
One of the interesting findings that came out of the malware analysis was that the Dutch language 
instructions of the ransomware were hard-coded and absolutely flawlessly written with no spelling 
errors. Dutch isn’t a common language at all, and it showed no signs of the use of an automatic 
translation service.  So, whoever wrote the malware must have written the Dutch himself or had access 
to someone who could provide the right text.
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Another crucial mistake the Coinvault authors made was leaving the compiler debugging mode on 
while compiling their malware, this left a Program Database (PDB) directory path hardcoded in the 
malware.
By simply using the Strings command in Linux, we were able to display all readable strings in the 
malware and also display the PDB paths, which looked something like this:
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Flawless Dutch hard-coded in the Coinvault source code
The debug artifacts for Coinvault sample 
e6227eaefc147e66e3c7fa87a7e90fd6.
In the example above, the PDB path C:\Users\Administrator\.. is rather generic, however the earlier 
samples of Coinvault contained the first and last names of the suspects. It might seem like a done deal 
from now on, but until we had additional evidence that could link the names to the malware, we would 
have to consider that it could be a false flag. 
Eventually, additional evidence came from one of the C2 servers they used in their campaign to launch 
their ransomware. This C2 server happened to be hosted on the website of an art-house cinema in the 
Netherlands. The location of this server was also established from the malware analysis. 
Upon this discovery, we requested a court-order for a wiretap on that specific server, this way we could 
effectively monitor their activity and determine the size of their botnet. 
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Screenshot of the botnet control panel, from where the criminals launched their ransomware.
Eventually, this wiretap paid off and the criminals made a mistake by connecting to the C2 server 
without the use of anonymization such as TOR or a VPN. They left four HTTP requests that we could 
trace back to a residential landline in the Netherlands. 
After checking the subscriber info of that specific landline, we discovered that the family living at that 
address had two sons, whose names matched up exactly with the names in the PDB path. Eventually, 
this case led to the arrest and conviction of the two brothers - more on the court case and what drove 
the criminals to commit their acts can be read here. 
Kraken Ransomware
PDB paths aren’t a thing of the past. In one McAfee ATR’s ransomware research reports from the end of 
2018, we took a closer look at Kraken ransomware, a new ransomware family that appeared in the 
summer of 2018. Kraken was also written in .NET and contained a PDB path with the name Krypton. 
This was done with the free reversing tool Radare2.
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Debug information on Kraken ransomware, including the PDB 
path with the username Krypton
Now this isn’t exactly a smoking gun, but it did help to hunt for other versions of Kraken based on the 
Krypton PDB path. Kraken ransomware is a typical Ransomware-as-a-service(RaaS) that is being offered 
to affiliates on one of the underground forums. 
Kraken was clearly developed with affiliates in mind. The ransomware executable had a built-in 
configuration file which most likely could be used by affiliates to fine tune their version of the virus. 
The details of the config file are clearly visible when the ransomware executable is examined with a 
simple hex-editor. 
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The Kraken Advertisement logo from one of the Underground hacker 
Forums
The config-file parameters clearly visible (highlighted in blue) in the executable using a simple hex-editor.




We extracted and compared all the config files from the Kraken samples that we found and built a large 
matrix.
All the versions we examined mostly contain the same options, changing only in some of them the anti-
virtual protection and anti-forensic capabilities.
Other differences in Kraken’s config file include the list of countries excluded from encryption. The 
standouts are Brazil and Syria, which were not named in the original forum advertisement. Having an 
exclusion list is a common method of cybercriminals to avoid prosecution. Brazil’s addition to the list in 
Version 1.5 suggests the involvement of a Brazilian affiliate. The following table shows the exclusion list 
by country and version. (The √ means the country appears on the list.)
15
Kraken’s different version numbers and features
A detailed analysis of Kraken can be found on the McAfee’s research blog page. 
Wildfire
Another Ransomware family that used a built-in configuration option and had a list of excluded 
countries was Wildfire ransomware. Wildfire was targeting small-to-medium business owners in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. 
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Kraken’s list of excluded countries per version
The Wildfire lock-screen
Wildfire was spread by phishing mail in flawless Dutch and extra convincing was that the criminals 
included the actual victim’s name and business address. 
Wildfire was active mid 2016 when Dutch High Tech Crime unit received a report from the private 
sector that the ransomware payment site with the decryption keys was located in the Netherlands. We 
started an investigation and pretty quickly we seized a copy of the specific server.  The server actually 
happened to be the command and control server for the ransomware and it had a web portal for the 
criminals to log into and see their infection statistics. Below is an overview of the web panel they used.
We see from this overview that in 31 days the campaign has infected 5,309 systems and earned total 
revenue of about BTC 136. Not a bad “paycheck” for a month of work.
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One of the phishing mails used to spread Wildfire ransomware. 
When we look at the “clients” page, we see that every victim is assigned a Unique Identifier (UID), their 
IP-address and country is stored as well as their private key which is used to decrypt their locked files.
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Wildfire’s web panel that shows the overview of infections and payments
Web panel page with the different victims and decryption keys
When we took a closer look at the machine itself, we found several files of interest. Something that 
stood out was the index.php file of the web panel, which contained comments in Russian Cyrillic in 
spite of the flawless Dutch used in the phishing mail. “исправить таймер” means “fix timer” and 
refers to the timer function of the ransomware.
This is an indicator that the person who built Wildfire might not be the one spreading it, thus being an 
affiliate-based ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), similar to Kraken and CTB-locker we discussed earlier. 
Another indicator to Wildfire being a RaaS can be found in the config file of the source code. This 
config-file contains a list of exempted countries that Wildfire will not encrypt when a victim is from a 
certain country. Wildfire based this exemption on the IP-address of the victim. Another common 
method used by ransomware for determining exemption is by looking at a victims keyboard  layout 
settings in addition to the IP-address.
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Cyrillic comments in the web panel source code
The list of allowed and banned countries in the ransomware config file.
Since we seized the complete server, we also obtained all the decryption keys. So now it was possible 
again to build another decryption tool with the help of the private sector. The decryption tool helped 
unlock about 20% of Wildfire’s victims within the first month.
NoMoreRansom
The Coinvault investigation wasn’t only a success because of the arrest of the criminal developers, but it 
was the start of something bigger. 
The successful public-private partnership that developed the first decryptor could not be ignored and 
asked for an initiative on a much larger scale. This initiative was going to be called NoMoreRansom 
(www.nomoreransom.org) and was started July 2016 by the Dutch Police, Europol’s European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and two cyber security companies–Kaspersky Lab and McAfee. 
The goal of NoMoreRansom is to help victims of ransomware retrieve their encrypted data without 
having to pay the criminals. This is achieved by law enforcement and the private sector working 
together building ransomware decryption tools based on decryption keys from seized servers, or flaws 
in the ransomware itself. 
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The NoMoreRansom logo
Today, NoMoreRansom has more than 129 partners and offers 59 free decryption tools that help 
decrypt more than 91 different ransomware families. Since the start, the initiative has already helped 
more than 72.000 infected computers, thus preventing more than 22 million US dollars from falling into 
criminal hands. It is the world’s number 1 repository of ransomware decryption tools.
The most recent success was releasing a decryption tool for a large number of versions of the 
GandCrab ransomware variant. This tool alone already decrypted more than 4400 victims of GandCrab, 
with several hundreds of thousands of other victims who could be helped.
General Prevention Advice
Benjamin Franklin once said “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” - this saying also 
goes for ransomware.
Below are some useful ransomware prevention tips gathered from various sources. Please note that this 
is not a limitative list of tips and prevention/security is an ongoing process. As ransomware evolves, so 
do the prevention methods.
• Back-up! Back-up! Back-up! Have a recovery system in place so a ransomware infection can’t destroy 
your personal data forever. It’s best to create two back-up copies: one to be stored in the cloud 
(remember to use a service that makes an automatic backup of your files) and one to store physically 
(portable hard drive, thumb drive, extra laptop, etc.). Disconnect these from your computer when you 
are done. Your back-up copies will also come in handy should you accidentally delete a critical file or 
experience a hard drive failure.
• Use robust antivirus software  to protect your system from ransomware. Do not switch off the 
‘heuristic functions’ as these help the solution to catch samples of ransomware that have not yet been 
formally detected.
• Network segmenting - Create a defense in depth for your network, so ransomware can’t easily 
propagate through your network once it has been activated.
• Robust identity management - Set-up policies on access control and consider multi-authentication 
on systems to prevent attackers from logging in with stolen passwords.
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• Keep all the software on your computer up to date.  When your operating system (OS) or 
applications release a new version, install it. And if the software offers the option of automatic 
updating, take it.
• Trust no one. Literally. Any account can be compromised, and malicious links can be sent from the 
accounts of friends on social media, colleagues or an online gaming partner. Never open attachments 
in emails from someone you don’t know. Cybercriminals often distribute fake email messages that 
look very much like email notifications from an online store, a bank, the police, a court or a tax 
collection agency, luring recipients into clicking on a malicious link and releasing the malware into 
their system.
• Enable the ‘Show file extensions’ option in the Windows settings on your computer. This will 
make it much easier to spot potentially malicious files. Stay away from file extensions like ‘.exe’, ‘.vbs’ 
and ‘.scr’. Scammers can use several extensions to disguise a malicious file as a video, photo, or 
document (like hot-chics.avi.exe or doc.scr).
• If you discover a rogue or unknown process on your machine, disconnect it immediately from the 
internet or other network connections (such as home Wi-Fi) — this can prevent the infection from 
spreading.
• Consider setting up a software restriction Policy (SRP) Prevent executables from running in a user’s 
%APPDATA% directory (TEMP and temporary Internet Files). A very large portion of ransomware runs 
from a user’s TEMP directory, so preventing executables from running here is an effective method in 
stopping a large portion of ransomware. However, this might need some additional fine tuning to 
make sure that all legitimate programs are able to run normally. I would only advise to do this if you 
know what you are doing. More info on Software Restriction Policies can be found in this useful article.
General Ransomware Incident response tips
• Below are some useful ransomware incident response tips for the technical consumer or small 
businesses. A larger corporate environment often has a better disaster recovery policy and there are 
more incident response resources.
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• Try to create a memory dump as soon as possible after you discover that you have been encrypted. 
DO NOT SHUT DOWN the computer before you have made a RAM capture. There might be valuable 
traces and even encryption keys left in the RAM memory. Dumpit is a great open source tool for this.
• DO NOT delete any files or ransom notes. Some families, like GandCrab, use the ransom note for 
decryption.
• Take pictures of the ransom note, e-mail addresses, Bitcoin addresses, etc. This will come in handy 
when determining the family of ransomware and when you want to file a police complaint. 
• Try to recover files with PhotoRec. Some ransomware versions make a copy of the existing files, 
encrypt them and then delete the original files. A tool like PhotoRec might help you to recover some 
of the lost files.
• If you are planning on putting back a back-up or formatting your drive, it is best to buy a new hard 
drive and store the encrypted one. There is a good chance that a decryption option might come 
available in the future. 
• Check online to determine which ransomware family has infected the machine. Knowing which 
ransomware you are facing is essential in finding a possible remediation. There are several useful 





• Visit NoMoreransom.org to find out if there is a decryption tool available, how to file a police 
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Ransomware attacks in 
insurance claims
Recent headlines have highlighted significant cyber threats to global businesses. The US insurer 
Anthem  paid a record $16 Million for a security breach when a hacker threatened to turn over patient 
records to the public. At the Arran Brewery in Scotland, bad actors used a call for résumés as a route to 
infection via a rogue PDF, causing the loss of 3 months of sales data. A water utility in North Carolina 
lost access to all automated systems from a virus dropped a week and a half after the initial Trojan 
attack. As ransomware attacks become more common and impact global business critical equipment 
and systems, insurers must educate their clients. Businesses may be underwritten to some degree for 
business interruption and data loss, but rarely through a dedicated cyber policy. Often a firm will only to 
start to think about such requirements on the day it happens.
Some good news is that the threat of being hit by a ransomware attack has decreased by about 30% 
from 2017 to 20181. However, the level of sophistication for the new variants of attacks is increasing, 
and 75% of infected organisations had an up-to-date virus protection system in place2. The cost to the 
business affected by these attacks averaged around $133,000 in 20173 with the estimated global 
damages reaching $11.5 billion by 20194. These are the real costs to the industry covering downtime, 
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response and lost opportunities, and exclude the 
ransom that may, or may not, have been paid.
Essentially, ransomware is software that prevents 
proper access to computers and business 
systems by locking the data using encryption. 
The software then demands payment, or ransom, 
in a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin to restore the 
system/data to operate normally. Imagine 
arriving into work and reading the words on the 
screen ‘Your files have been locked’. As referred 
to above, getting back up and running can be 
costly. The firm must pay for restoring the 
computers or data to a pre-attack condition so 
that they can continue the business operation. 
These costs can come in the form of overtime 
that is needed to cover activities during the 
interruption, fees for the diagnosing firm, which 
is typically an outside consultancy firm, 
additional monitoring of the systems for new 
attacks, restoration of backups or timely 
recreation of lost data, and in some cases a 
complete overhaul of the equipment. 
Historical forms of ransomware still allowed the 
user control of the system, and although they 
had to battle through annoying popups, the 
ransoms were typically under €100. More 
recently, however, the sophisticated ransomware 
attacks have become more targeted to publicly 
traded companies and critical infrastructures 
such as water plants and hospitals, with the 
amounts requested starting at around €100,000 
and going into the millions. Some can gain entry 
through phishing, an Adobe Flash vulnerability, 
RDP and numerous other methods.   
When it comes to adjusting a cyber-claim, it can 
be complicated and confusing. Having a high-
level process to use can help bring some clarity, 
and streamline towards a successful claim 
investigation. While it isn’t possible to create a 
script that will work for every claim, there are a 
few steps and questions that can be used to put 
you onto the correct path.
The initial goal is to understand the impact of the 
breach and determine the scope of what was 
affected. In order to gain a basis of understand-
ing to what will transpire during the investi-
gation, there are a number of critical elements 
that need to be identified. This stage is mostly 
about gathering information on how the breach 
was detected. Questions such as: “Who 
identified the event and how?”, “What actions 
were observed within the network?”, and “What 
alerts were presented?” should be used to create 
the observed chain of events before and during 
the attack. 
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Also at this stage, it is necessary to gain an 
understanding of the infrastructure of the 
organisation. This will help with the type and 
extent of infiltration being reviewed. Other 
questions include: “What sort of network 
technology and topology is being used?”, “What 
type of network and physical security is in 
place?”, “How is the security monitored?”, and 
“How many workstations are on the network?” 
These are details of the environment that need 
to be understood that will lead to developing a 
practical approach on how to investigate the 
event properly.
Now that the background information has been 
initially assessed, it is essential to determine the 
infection and level of access reached quickly. 
There are thousands of different types of attacks 
that can happen and knowing what kind was 
used will be key to work through the event 
successfully. Here it is essential to understand 
what may have been compromised, the extent of 
the damage, what measures were used to 
determine the type of attack, and how the loss 
affects the insured and other parties.
Areas of consideration are determining if 
antivirus/antimalware was used, if and how much 
data was taken, how many of the systems were 
infected, what level of access was granted, and 
what was the method of attack. The various 
forms of attack such as phishing, malware, 
unsupported software, and password attacks all 
present themselves differently. Knowing the 
defences and attack types will lead to an 
understanding of the level of access gained and 
resulted from damage, as well as the remediation 
required.
It is best to proceed with caution if an 
investigation shows that data may have been lost 
or exfiltrated by a third-party, primarily financial, 
private, or protected information. Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII), Protected Health 
Information (PHI) and Intellectual Property (IP) 
can all be areas that may require regulatory 
compliance reporting and/or legal action. This is 
also the stage when the decision should be 
made to br ing in a qual i f ied forensic 
investigation firm. There may be requirements to 
retain information for analysis and testimony, to 
verify that no further breach occurred, to 
determine cause and effect of the event 
accurately, and to quantify costs to bring the 
insured back to a pre-loss condition.
The specific details of each claim will be 
different, but they should all mostly follow this 
rough process we have described. The best way 
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to illustrate this process is by using a couple of 
case studies.
Case Example #1 – Manufacturer’s distribution 
plant finds that they can’t access their 
ordering system.
Ordering systems are vital to productivity, and 
without them, the distribution warehouse 
computer database is paralysed. It was found 
that an employee had opened a phishing email a 
month prior, which compromised one of their 
servers. As it was a large firm, the vulnerability 
was posted for sale to the Darknet making it 
available to any cybercriminal. The malware was 
later executed on 13 other computers in the 
network. During the inactivity of night, the bad 
actor then used remote desktop protocol (RDP) 
to connect through to the remaining 12 servers 
and ran encryption to block access to the data. 
The result was thousands of encrypted files, 
Microsoft Exchange emails encrypted and 
unusable, the booking system compromised and 
their product storage allocation data no longer 
accessible. 
The systems were running an antivirus solution. 
However, this wasn’t kept up to date or used to 
scan the computers regularly, therefore allowing 
the threat to escalate freely. Additionally, RDP 
connections were allowed on most of the 
machines from unsecured sources and were 
internet facing, enabling the risk to spread to 13 
servers. Disabling this option or limiting the RDP 
capabilities may have mitigated the threat to 
only one server. Given the configuration in place, 
full administrator access was gained through a 
weak RDP password, and the danger was 
successful in accessing the network. 
Intellectual property and PII was available to the 
attacker allowing further leverage for the attacker 
to increase the threat by intimidating the firm 
with the additional danger that the details would 
be sold to the highest bidder, or worse, 
published to the public on the dark web or 
similar. In addition, the backups were networked 
and encrypted too. There were no backups 
available on the cloud, and any remaining 
physical tapes that existed were all out of date, 
causing a loss of data. 
As a result of the data loss, the company 
decided that the ransom of 20 Bitcoins, around 
€200,000 at the time of this writing, was to be 
paid due to the fact it would have cost them 
more than this amount in business interruption 
and lost orders. 
Although this business’ contingency plan was 
non-existent, the recovery was reasonably 
efficient. The most critical item was the business 
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development and operations platform. Even 
after paying the ransom, due to the modular 
dependencies of software, it was not possible to 
reconstruct the full database successfully. Luckily, 
the firm that produced their software had a copy 
that was used to rebuild the interface to the 
database. The software interface was restored, 
and the newly decrypted database was 
reconnected, allowing them to take orders, 
access current instructions and so forth.
Case Example #2 – US University PII 
Compromise
A Microsoft Windows Workstation was infected 
with a backdoor, remote access Trojan (RAT) that 
allowed uninhibited administrative access. The 
infection arrived by way of malicious code 
attached to one of the emails.  Once installed, it 
used the RAT to open a specific Ethernet port 
providing access to the bad actor(s).
Software utilities such as file compression 
utilities, network scanners, and name server 
scanners were identified as being installed.  Also, 
other possible services, such as password 
harvesters, were found to have artefacts available 
to confirm their use. The harvesters were in place 
to mainly gather typical office documents and 
PDF type extensions. 
Additional computers had keyloggers installed 
and were utilised to harvest credentials. Domain 
administrator credentials were stolen and used to 
take over 21 systems within the network. 
Another 12 systems were compromised by 
introducing a web-based threat to a web server, 
a web variant of malware that a web-browser 
would provide access to. This allowed the risk to 
spread laterally throughout the network. 
The bad actor completed searches in an attempt 
to steal more data from the various campuses. A 
PowerShell utility was used to obtain Active 
Directory and local password data from the 
Active Directory database. The Active Directory 
is the way Microsoft Windows authenticates 
users and, once this is compromised, the whole 
network is compromised. 
The bad actors didn’t aim to disrupt the day to 
day business of the university but instead 
harvested details. As the bad actors were careful 
not to do any activity that would be detected, 
this allowed lateral movement through the 
network. Once the breach was identified, a 
minimum of 53 systems had been accessed, and 
the remediation efforts required hundreds of 
thousands of euros, and many hours of lost time, 
to rectify the situation.
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By understanding some of the more common 
types of attacks, and how ransomware, in 
particular, is utilised, the process of adjusting a 
claim can be streamlined.
A single user clicking on an unscrupulous link is 
usually the route that enables malware to 
execute on a single system. Other common ways 
are through a URL link in an Office document, 
using a PDF embedded in an email file inside 
another email to evade detection or macros 
inside Microsoft Office documents. Macros 
execute commands within a document, such as 
sending emails or running executables, and by 
merely opening and running the macros this can 
install or create the conditions to install 
ransomware.
Weak RDP password credentials, allowing 
connections without network level authen-
tication, and allowing RDP connections can 
enable the threat to spread laterally instead of 
isolating it to one workstation. In our experience, 
the antivirus programs on workstations are 
usually weak, non-existent, non-reactive, not 
kept updated or a mixture of these factors.
When it comes to the time taken to effect 
recovery, we have found that on many occasions 
offline backups fail to exist or are out of date. 
Having close to real-time backups stored in a 
way that will isolate them from a ransomware 
event can circumnavigate the need to pay the 
ransom in order to access the encrypted data.
In the cases that we have discussed, the ransom 
was paid as the loss financially, and hours lost to 
the business would be considerably more than 
the ransom sum. This lack of preparedness by 
companies creates the opportunity for system 
hackers, and the need for ransom payments thus 
encouraging more attacks in the future. 
Contingency planning, vetting security firms that 
can aid before and after an attack, staff training 
and discussing options for obtaining an 
additional, more specific cyber policy can all 
soften the impact, or even stop altogether, the 
spectre of ransomware that looms over the 
global business institution. 
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I. The cyber crime scene
This article discusses the difficulties encountered in performing the memory analysis of a Windows 
Server 2008 R2 machine apparently infected by ransomware. A company based in São Paulo called us 
in a case in which its database server had been infected by malware. The infection, unfortunately, had 
encrypted the files that contained the client data. There was no backup of these files.
In terms of an analysis of malicious artifacts, it is usually sought to follow an investigative methodology 
for gathering evidence. In cases involving ransomware, generally, the artifacts are the encrypted files 
(which in this case have been found) and files that are related to the creation of public and private keys. 
Not in this case.
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This article discusses the difficulties encountered in performing the memory 
analysis of a Windows Server 2008 R2 machine apparently infected by 
ransomware. A company based in São Paulo called us in a case in which its 
database server had been infected by malware. The infection, unfortunately, had 
encrypted the files that contained the client data. There was no backup of these 
files.
by Paulo Henrique Pereira
An investigative methodology proposed by SANS  makes the following points:
• Identify rogue processes
• Analyze process DLLs and handles
• Review network artifacts
• Look for evidence of code injection
• Check for signs of rootkit
• Dump suspicious processes and drivers
This methodology may or may not be followed strictly by the forensic analyst, and in the case we are 
investigating, we chose to follow what was possible with this methodology because we were not at the 
crime scene at the time of the attack and we were not the ones who captured the memory of the 
compromised machine. So, in the moment of the investigative work, we decided to identify rogue 
processes and dump suspicious processes. 
II. The infection
The malware actually featured a vector type that created a .frogo extension in each file, encrypting the 
data in its directories, and is believed to have uninstalled itself right after installation, since no evidence 
of the machine was found.
III. Approach for analyzing memory artifacts and extracting data from files
The type of extension was not known to us. Site searches have been conducted for a preliminary survey 
on this type of artifact. However, the scarcity of information about this ransomware did not allow us to 
find tools to decrypt the files. The initial approach was to perform forensic analysis of files and the 
compromised machine by capturing memory. An important detail is that the memory capture was done 
five days after the attack, and the compromised machine being rebooted in that time by the company's 
employees (in an attempt to recover the data).
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For the analysis of the captured memory, we used Volatility (on a Linux machine) and for extracting 
data from files, we used Autopsy and bulk_extractor (both on a Windows machine). Memory capture 
was done using the FTK Imager Lite.
IV. Using Volatility for Forensic Investigation
The restricted access that we initially had to understand what was happening was only diminished when 
we received the captured memory of the compromised machine. So the preliminary data that could 
reveal some trace of the contamination began to be investigated. We started with Volatility to find out 
something about the machine. The first result in the figure below reveals the operating system and 
memory capture date.
As you can see, the operating system has Service Pack 1, so we followed the investigation with this 
profile looking for rogue processes still active on the machine. Our biggest problem is that memory was 
captured five days after the infection started. 
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IV.a Searching for rogue process
As mentioned by SANS methodology approach, below is the output of the pslist command in an 
attempt to find evidence of processes that are extraneous to the operating system.
At first glance, what strikes us is a last process that was not finalized in the system, that is, it is still active 
and whose offset is:
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In summary, two pieces of evidence came to our attention: the first is the explorer.exe process whose 
PPID is not listed and the other is the offset 0xfffffa80090a2250 of a process with 
PID = 0 and PPID = 0. 
No PID and no PPID. What is this process supposed to be? Is the ransomware signed on the machine? 
Is any process running by company employees? Of course, this process is a candidate to be examined 
more closely. Why does the explorer.exe appear without a PPID?
Trying to find answers to these questions, maybe a possible cause of hidden process, the next step is to 
launch the psscan plugin that can be used to check for rootkits and hidden artifacts. According to what 
is exemplified on the Volatility Command reference page, the plugin is used against a Windows 7 
memory image, which suggests that it can also be used in a Windows Server 2008 R2 memory image. 
According to what is exemplified on the Volatility Command reference page, the plugin is used against 
a Windows 7 memory image, which suggests that it can also be used in a Windows Server 2008 R2 
memory image. The plugin scanning the _POOL_HEADER tag. But, we did not find anything with 
psscan.
Why did this occur? Is it a normal fact that in the Windows Server 2008 r2 memory image the psscan 
couldn't scan the _POOL_HEADER tag and show us a blank output? There are many unanswered 
questions.
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IV.b. Dumping the suspicious process
An attempt to find some answers was to extract the process through the procdump plugin. We created 
a folder called dump and the extraction was done. For the listed offset, we were unable to use 
procdump.
After this step, the use of the strings tool with the -n 4 | grep.exe (see the complete command in the 
figure below) was made and the result was a single output: explorer.exe.
The | grep option just reveals the file explorer.exe. Using strings against the executable in the dump 
folder, without | grep, no significant textual records were found, such as passwords or keys (as in the 
case of Wannacry). We can see in the final output the C++ signature.
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Another way to look for traces is to use the yarascan plugin. The first attempt was made to use a -Y 
"frogo" rule as a defining rule on the fly to look for evidence of infection or, to some extent, some kind 
of record that might present the presence of this malware in the machine because the only 
demonstration of the presence of the infection is the extension of the encrypted files (figure below).
So, yarascan can reveal something like (some offender words are founded and blanked in the figure):
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The "http" scanner option is applying the on the fly rule to the PID process = 948 (MsMpEng.exe) to 
find url:
According to Volatility Lab site, the following information can be found in Shellbags:
• Windows sizes and preferences 
• Icon and folder view settings 
• Metadata such as MAC timestamps 
• Most recently used files and file type (zip, directory, installer)  
• Files, folders, zip files, installers that existed at one point on the system (even if deleted). 
• Network Shares and folders within the shares 
• Metadata associated with any of the above types which may include timestamps and absolute paths 
• True crypt volumes 
The volshell plugin to disassemble 0xfffffa8002ef5b10:
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V. Attempt to extract evidence from an image
The traces found with the use of Volatility reveal what could be evidence of infection caused by 
malware, but no executable file was found, no file containing the public key. What you have is a generic 
notice with payment instructions. Faced with this situation, the research strategy we set up (which may 
not be the most profitable) was to analyze the image of the memory of the compromised machine. 
After the investigation step with Volatility, it was decided to use bulk_extractor and Autopsy (whose 
records will not be shown here).
As mentioned before, the cyber attack that affected the machine encrypted the files and prevented the 
company's business continuity. We did not have access to the malware executable, which usually 
deletes itself from the system after infection.
In that sense, the company had its files infected by malware of the type that encrypts the data, called 
ransomware. The ransomware is called FROGO. Immediately, efforts were begun to break the 
encryption imposed on SQLITE files, unsuccessfully so far. We were in person at the company on 
10/10/2018 from 2 pm until around 7 pm. Immediately, we were informed that a type of attack was in 
progress trying to capture the password of the database system. Promptly, we began a job of replacing 
a cyber defense line for the company, finding out what was open on the company's external IP, because 
the database was exposed to the internet traffic and the server did not have a proper defense to the 
outgoing traffic and the database could be directly accessed from the Internet. 
Once these loopholes had been discovered, we executed the closing of the open ports of the database 
and other services. Even after the establishment of a cyber defense line, the attacks continued. Two 
software programs installed in the company reported these attacks: Norton Security and Pfense. With 
this data, server protection, the main target of the attacks, was initiated with the above mentioned 
protective measures. It turned out that the company was exposed and we corrected that flaw. The 
attack denounced by these software clearly had the purpose of accessing the server where the 
database was.  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There are two clear possibilities for the attack: 
• The attack was random, and the company was chosen at random, which usually occurs.
• The attack was deliberate because the encrypted files directly affected the business continuity of the 
company. 
Our analysis only comes to this point, because to show if the attack is random or deliberate requires 
further investigation.
VI. Forensics analysis using bulk_extractor
The forensic analysis carried out by me has been restricted to the moment, to find vestiges and 
evidences of the attack itself, based on a forensic technique called "RAM analysis". The procedure 
stems from the memory capture of the compromised machine, performed under my guidance, using 
FTK IMAGER Lite software, version 3.11. Below is what was discovered analyzing bulk_extractor URLs 
histogram for onion domain. In descending order (the number before the onion’s domain name is the 
requisitions or visits/accesses). This is strong evidence that this access has been made from the 
compromised machine:
More evidence found in the bulk_extractor URLs indexes are the requisitions:
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Volatility’s yarascan plugin running against the “onion” rule reveals that the process ShKernel.exe has 
been a registry of onion domain, as we can see in figure below. 
VII. Conclusion
The article presented a stage of our work in the company. We're still working on breaking the file 
encryption key, but the customer was happy that we were able to recover the entire credit card share 
through Autopsy. But this step needs to be described separately because it is very extensive. However, 
with respect to the challenge presented by the type of ransomware, some lessons could be drawn by 
us, such as the need to develop plugins to analyze ransomware artifacts.
These were our efforts to find traces of the attack. There are other procedures being performed at this 
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A forensic analysis of the 
Electronic Point Record 
System
ABSTRACT
The electronic point registration system is a set of computerized equipment and programs with the 
purpose of electronically recording the entry and exit of employees in companies or institutions. 
Although the electronic record brings several benefits, some companies can use only one computer 
program to carry out the journey record and this work comes to show that this record may not always 
reflect the actual journey of the worker, which has been causing numerous technical and legal 
discussions. With the use of computer forensics, this article details studies of cases in which this 
scenario has been identified that results in some learning and suggestions.
Keywords – Electronic point registration system, Employees.
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The electronic point registration system is a set of computerized equipment and 
programs with the purpose of electronically recording the entry and exit of 
employees in companies or institutions. Although the electronic record brings 
several benefits, some companies can use only one computer program to carry 
out the journey record and this work comes to show that this record may not 
always reflect the actual journey of the worker, which has been causing 
numerous technical and legal discussions.
by André Ruschel
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon for technology, in some cases, to replace human labor, and the current point clock 
was already a manual annotation work carried out by an official, until in the year 1888, the American 
jeweler named Willard Le Grand Bundy (New York, USA) invented the Clock [1] that allowed employees 
to drill a card to record their workday.  As soon as Bundy created this watch, he already predicted that 
there could be manipulations and adopted individual keys for each employee, thus making it 
impossible for a person to "knock" multiple cards.
In Brazil, the point clock was adopted by the Brazilian business and working classes only in the 
government of the then president, Getúlio Vargas, in which a set of laws was created – the CLT 
(consolidation of labor laws) [2]. Thus, the first equipment emerged, precisely, to meet the needs arising 
from the control of the working day in the country. 
In these laws, three forms of journey control were established: by manual point (manuscript), 
mechanical control or even electronic point. Initially, there were only the first two forms, performed by 
means of annotations, in the book point, or by marking in mechanical clock. 
However, it was in Law nº. 7.855, of October 24, 1989 [3], which the "Electronic System" appeared. 
Only after the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) created and approved Ordinance 1.510 [4] 
were guidelines established for the use of the electronic system in the control of the journey and the 
technical requirements necessary for the equipment of the point that was the Electronic Point Recorder 
– REP.
The electronic point recorder-REP is a piece of automation equipment used exclusively for the 
registration of work hours and with the ability to issue fiscal documents and carry out fiscal controls, 
referring to the entry and exit of employees at work sites. Although this electronic peer recorder 
understands equipment (hardware), he also needs a program (software) with the function of performing 
the treatment of the markings, that is, it allows to connect (seek/import) the markings of the electronic 
register and to treat this information, generating reports of frequency and mirror of point, being still 
possible to administer overtime, clearances, days paid and bank of hours. 
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In addition, many Brazilian companies are based on the ordinance of the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (MTE) nº 373, of February 25, 2011 [5], in which they are authorized by convention or 
collective labor agreement, use only the program (software) to perform your employees' journey 
records.  However, it occurs that not all companies have the electronic point recorder (hardware) and 
program (software) set. However, they are in agreement with the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (MTE) nº 1.510, of August 21, 2009.
With this work, it seeks to cover scenarios of companies that follow the ordinance of the Ministry of 
Labor and Employment (MTE) nº 1.510, but it deepens exactly in cases of companies that are only 
based on the ordinance of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº 373, those that use only the 
program (software) to perform the registration, in which this point control system has several pre-
established operating policies (rules). In some situations, the program (software) was developed 
(created/elaborated) by the company itself, which holds the source code and which, in the vast majority 
of cases, works only within the intranet (similar to the Internet, however, of exclusive use of an 
organization), in which access to the system is performed through login.
Based on this, the present work aims to present not only legal aspects involved, but especially the 
technical aspects, considering several situations found in loco about the electronic point registration 
system.
This work is organized as follows: in Section II, the legal aspects and technical standards are presented; 
Section III will discuss alerts and situations in the work environment; Section IV presents a case study; 
Section V shows the proof of concept and finally, in section VI, the conclusion and future works.
II. LEGAL ASPECTS AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Let us now take an approach on some legal aspects and technical norms more relevant to this work.
The annotation of timesheet appeared in the Consolidation of Labor Laws nº. 5.452 of May 1, 1943, we 
cite Art. 74 - § 1 - The working schedule will be recorded in the register of employees with the 
indication of collective agreements or contracts concluded.
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Paragraph 2 - For establishments with more than ten employees, a record of the time of entry and exit 
must be recorded in a manual, mechanical or electronic register, according to instructions to be issued 
by the Ministry of Labor, and there must be pre-signaling of the rest period.
The so-called "Electronic Point Law" is represented by Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº. 
1.510, dated August 21, 2009, whose purpose is to faithfully record the markings made by the 
employee, in which no action is allowed as time restrictions on point marking, automatic point marking, 
predetermined times or contractual hours, requirement by the prior authorization system for overtime 
marking, or the existence of any device that allows the change of recorded data.
In addition to the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº 1.510, there is the 
Ministerial Order of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº. 373, dated February 25, 2011, 
which came to update some information of Ordinance 1.510, the use of methods and provides for the 
possibility of adoption by employers of alternative systems of working day control since authorized by 
Convention or Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the technical aspect, there is Ordinance Nº 480, dated December 15, 2011 - National Institute of 
Metrology, quality and technology - INMETRO [6] and later the Ministry of Labor and Employment 
(MTE) nº 101, of January 13, 2012 [7] in which there was a Cooperation Agreement signed between 
INMETRO and the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE), as well as the Ministry's initiative to 
formally delegate to INMETRO the activities of planning, developing and implement the Compliance 
Assessment Program of the Electronic Point Recorders -REP, through the advice of the MTE.
Subsequent to the aforementioned Ordinances, others have appeared that have brought complements, 
although all of them are fundamental for the elaboration of Electronic Point Recorder (hardware), as well 
as standardization standards for firmware development.
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III. ALERTS AND SITUATIONS IN THE WORK ENVIRONMENT
In business, many computers contain evidence that is useful in many human resource circumstances. 
Thus, allegations of discrimination, sexual harassment and unfair offenses are serious threats that are 
best understood when one knows what an employee did.
Because computers and programs are such a pervasive part of the professional life of most employees, 
analyzing the data stored on those computers and databases helps solve numerous problems. In 
investigations involving human resources, we analyze some technical procedures that are classified as 
"non-compliance", when faced with norms, ordinances and labor laws.
With regard to data collection and analysis found in forensic computer skills, there was a wealth of 
information on the activities of human resources and information technology workers who are useful, if 
not determinant, in investigations of the system (software) of the Electronic Point Record.
In addition, it is in this system (software) that information relevant to workdays is recorded and, using 
forensic computation, one can trace the steps used by a dishonest employee or employer to provide 
the evidence necessary for fair and resolute decisions.
Usually, problems always involve one or more employees who have privileged access to the system. 
However, there are different types of fraud or theft by employees ranging from misappropriation of 
assets and supplier fraud, payroll fraud, accounting fraud, data theft, and also bribery and corruption. 
Here are a few that they involve:
• Data theft
Data theft is greater, thanks to the way you currently work using computerized systems instead of 
records and paper files. There are thefts of trade secrets, customer data and contact lists, and the theft 
of "personally identifiable information," such as people's credit card numbers and bank details.
• Misappropriation of assets
Misappropriation of assets has a variety of faces, all of which are quite common in business. There is 
theft of physical inventory, as well as theft of money and services. This way, employees can defraud your 
company by lying about their expenses and falsifying values from those accounts.
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Payment fraud includes items like vendor fraud schemes and fake customer accounts created 
specifically to make fraudulent payments. This can mean making self-authorized payments as well as 
working with others to claim money under false pretenses. In that sense, an employer may fraudulently 
claim an employee compensation policy, conduct a health insurance fraud, or falsify sales data to obtain 
higher commission payments.
• Account Fraud
When unscrupulous people have access to their accounting systems, it can cause havoc, embezzlement 
and fraud of accounts payable, fake vendors, unauthorized personal purchases, and accounts receivable 
fraud. Therefore, accounts receivable fraud covers things like deviance, where an employee gets the 
money that his or her company effectively voided, which is rarely tracked. Some people even create 
fake accounts and sales in an effort to make the company more successfully achieve its goals.
• Bribery and corruption
Bribes, kickbacks, ghost-company schemes and surrogate products are examples of bribery and 
corruption. And like all other types of fraud being covered, the systems that companies use daily are 
exploited by fraudsters for their own purposes.
Also, people usually end up being greedy and are discovered, but since it's too late to take preventive 
measures, it makes sense to conduct sensible background checks on any employee who has access to 
their IT systems, even more, for people who have total freedom or really control those systems.
Many of these evidences are difficult to eliminate, even a computer user who wants to cover their tracks 
can wipe some of this information, but usually some data ends up being discovered in an investigation. 
However, even savvy and sophisticated people will have trouble eliminating everything, as even 
deleting information will leave traces.
• Payroll Fraud
So-called ghost employee schemes involve wages paid to a fake employee or a former employee who 
is still on the payroll. And time-table fraud is when someone falsifies their time sheets, adds overtime, 
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or causes another person to log in and out of the company, or even modifies timekeeping information 
in the company's system.
In addition to the mentioned situations, there is still a new situation, it is understood that the Electronic 
Point Record system is reliable, especially when using the Electronic Recorder Point (hardware) and 
program (software). It turns out that when only the software program is used, the scenario already 
suffers from some "nonconformities":
A. When using the Electronic Point Recorder (hardware) and the software program (Software)
Following the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº 1.510, of August 21, 2009, 
in which adopting Electronic Point Recorder (hardware) and software (software) for registration, data 
reliability is the employee's record is made directly at the recorder.
Although not mentioned in the above Ordinance, the use of biometric features, in this case, fingerprint 
with an optical biometric reader, which compares to an image database with the recorded digital, 
would bring numerous safety benefits.
Some Electronic Point Record systems offer other forms of access control: Use of biometrics, magnetic 
card, typing of a password, using the Electronic Point Recorder's keyboard directly or an approach card.
According to INMETRO Ordinance nº 595, of December 5, 2013 [8], all records and occurrences are 
stored in the Point Register Memory (MRP) and can also generate the Data Source File (AFD) that is the 
file where all the data is stored in the MRP.
In this case, MRP is constituted as a means of data storage, with the capacity to retain recorded data for 
at least 10 (ten) years, which can not be erased, overwritten or altered, directly or indirectly.
Even though it is very efficient to use the electronic point recorder, there are some warning situations 
when using the "Point Record Processing Program":
✦Due to lack of paper in the watch's print coil, employees will not record their work in the Electronic 
Point Recorder;
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✦Although INMETRO Ordinance nº 595, of December 5, 2013, cite in item 5.2.4.2 "In the case of 
paper jammed, of paper lacking that does not allow to complete the printing or of other usual events 
of inhibition of the impression of the Voucher, the REP cannot allow the next point marking.”
It occurs that, often, the paper is not replaced on the same day, preceding precedent to manual 
releases.
✦Although mentioned in the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) Ordinance No. 1,510 - Art. 12 
Sole Paragraph. "The data processing function shall be limited to adding information to complement 
any omissions in the point record or to indicate undue markings", an aggravating circumstance is 
visualized in cases in which the employee stops recording directly in the Electronic Point Recorder (be 
it the day of entry, interval or exit), because, in this way, the registration is done later manually by your 
hierarchical superior or responsible for the specific sector, which may not reflect with your actual 
working day, as in the same way , being informed of contradictory times.
B. When using only software for registration
The use of technology usually solves numerous problems, but on the other hand, it also brings others, 
since, when the Electronic Point Record System is implemented, especially when only the program for 
registration is used, some situations occur; the main ones are:
• It is not verified, in the Ordinances, what would be the technical standards for the development of the 
point registration program;
• Although the Ministerial Order of Labor and Employment (MTE) nº 1.510 cites in Art. 7 the receipt of 
the employee's proof, this resource is not investigated when only the program is used and not every 
employee has a printer of his own disposition;
The INMETRO Ordinance nº 595, dated December 5, 2013, cites in item 5.1.14 "The REP must have a 
printer mechanism in paper reel, integrated and exclusively for the equipment, that allows contrasting 
color printing with paper, in legible characters with the following characteristics:
a) Maximum horizontal density of 8 (eight) characters per centimeter;
b) The character cannot have height less than 3 (three) millimeters;
50
c) The durability of the printing cannot be less than five years, using the type of printing paper 
indicated by the supplier in the Operational Manual."
• At the time the program allows printing, the common type of paper is usually used, which has no 
durability over the years;
• Time zone issues when the company is based in several regions;
• Inexistence of the adoption of Electronic Point Recorder (hardware) equipment;
• In every computer system, more specifically, a program has the "root" or "administrator" super-user 
who has superior privileges, which can or could make undue access to the point registration system;
• Fragility of security by using only the username and personal password, not using biometrics feature 
or double authentication factor;
• Implementations in the source code of routines containing predefined rules or automated routines;
• Locks in the point registration system (be it for start, interval or end of journey);
• A system that logs off and "knocks" the user off, so that the exact working time is not recorded 
correctly;
• It does not offer the function of generating the Data Source File - AFD, from the data stored in the 
MRP, much less the option of using an external memory device through the Fiscal Port;
• When tax files are requested, only one .txt file (text file extension) is exported from the system 
without at least bringing the hash of the file;
• It does not offer the possibility of issuing the RIM as a quotation INMETRO Ordinance nº 595, of 
December 5, 2013, in item 5.1.2 "REP must have a unique button with" RIM ", in the red color, for 
the emission of the Instantaneous Link of Markings; and another unique button, "i" ID, in italic text, in 
blue color, for the printing of your public key and the software identifiers."
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IV. REAL CASE
This paper seeks to show a real case about the situation where the employee registration - Point 
Electronic Registration System uses only the program developed by the company's own IT team.
The scenario brings some relevant points:
A. The system was hosted on company servers, in the case of private cloud;
B. Using the company's computers, employees made their work records;
C. They logged in on computers that had Windows 7 and Windows 10 installed;
D. Only after logging on to Windows, they accessed a web system, re-entered their credentials (user 
and password), and finally performed the registration;
E. It is assumed that in this process, depending on the configuration of the workstation, such as the 
intranet speed, you will lose a good amount of time to register the journey.
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Figure 1. Client / server infrastructure for access to electronic registration system.
Software:
The Electronic Point Record program is a web system, developed in Java [9] and that uses the 
PostgreSQL database [10].
When developing an Electronic Point Record system, it is necessary to have a clear definition of rules by 
means of computational functions and algorithms, to define, therefore, the access to this system of 
point registers. Also, it is essential to have an authentication, which is the act of providing identity to an 
application or network resource.
Typically, the identity is approved by a cryptographic operation that uses a key known only to the user, 
such as public key cryptography, or a shared key. Thus, the server side of the authentication exchange 
compares the signed data with a known encryption key to validate the authentication attempt [11].
In addition, in order for the employee to log his/her work day, it is advisable to first access the 
computer with a username and password (authenticating in the Active Directory - Microsoft Windows 
Server Directory Service) [12] and then perform a new authentication in the Electronic Point Record 
System using a new user and password again. However, this time, authenticating in the Electronic Point 
Record system itself.
In authentication, the user must present something that only he knows or possesses, and may even 
involve verifying personal physical characteristics. Most current systems require a password (something 
that only the user knows), however, there are more modern systems using smart cards (something that 
the user has) or physical characteristics (something intrinsic to the user), such as hand, retina or face 
format, fingerprint and speech recognition.
Biometric systems are automatic identity analysis systems based on physical characteristics of the user, 
which are intended to address security deficiencies of passwords that may be revealed or discovered.
In this case, there are some vulnerabilities because of the fragility of the password and also the 
significance of these, as well as a possibility of fraud in the employee's work records.
Thus, with no biometric authentication, the expertise pointed to evidence that a user (employee) who 
worked in branch A and who had never worked in branch B, performed registrations through the 
Electronic Point Registration System, using a branch office workstation B.
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It was also verified that the Electronic Point Record based on a web system allowed the use of a bot, 
that is, allows autonomous applications running through the Internet to perform the predetermined task 
of recording the day.
We observed that there was not even the impression of proof of daily work, which would be the 
principal mechanism of proof.
It is analyzed that when the employee registers his/her morning entry day before or after 8:30 am, the 
system itself performs the standard day appointment. If his schedule is to start at 8:30 am and finish at 
5:30 pm, it is at those exact times that the system made the note, without making any previous notice 
to him.
Example of an original markup:
Example of times that have been logged by the system:
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Figure 2. Timetable made by the 
employee.
Figure 3. Standard marking performed 
by the system.
There are locks on the system that logs the user down with predefined time in the Electronic Point 
Record system.
It was observed that at the moment in which there are automated registrations by the system (logoff), 
the employee has the option to agree or disagree. It is only registered when the SIM option is selected.
Only record of concordances not reflecting reality.
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Figure 4. Information of the time that the system will log off (the electronic point 
record fails).
Figure 5. Marking of concordances.
IDA Pro [13] was used, which is a multiplatform and multiprocessor debugger that converts machine 
executable code into assembly language source code for debugging and reverse engineering 
purposes. After debugging the software (program) used for Electronic Point Record, there are some 
non-conformities about automation of records such as "log automatically beat ...." and "the registration 
will be done automatically .."
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
To exemplify how some Electronic Point Record systems have automated procedures, which are largely 
obscure to the user, an example that must be considered a proof of concept will be presented in this 
subsection. A very small fragment was created to show how Electronic Point Record systems record the 
scenario in which:
1. Only one program (software) is used for Electronic Point Record of employees;
2. The system contains routines in the code that restrict the registration at the point and now automates 
"beats" without the employee's consent;
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Figure 6. Evidence of automation in the Electronic Point Record system.
3. No proof of receipt (receipts);
For example, some lines of code were formed:
1- Registers entry time1: Registers appointment automatically after 3 seconds - 08h00min03s;
2- Registers exit time1: Automatically registers appointment after 3 seconds - 12h00min03s;
3- Registers entry time2: Automatically registers entry after 3 seconds - 14h00min03s;
4 - Records exit time2: Automatically registers after 3 seconds - 18h00min03s.
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Figure 7. Flowchart of the Electronic Point Record system.
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Figure 8. Code lines with automations (code listing for copying at the end of the article).
VI. CONCLUSION
At a time when the future of work is being discussed, where the personification of robots is already 
discussed, with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, one encounters existing 
Ordinances and norms that are or were essential and of great value, but as in the cases presented in 
this paper, they do not contemplate globally and do not go deeper when one chooses to use only a 
computer program to perform the registration related to the entry and exit of employees in the 
workplace, where even with the whole the advent of technology, allows for possible manipulation.
Although the expertise in Electronic Point Record system is complex and scarce, involving many factors, 
it has brought here a new perspective on the "modus operandi" whether worker or employer.
Based on the traces left in an electronic point record system (program), the information found can help 
in the correct interpretation of the data obtained by the expertise, which are of fundamental 
importance for the determination of artifacts of non-compliance with the Law.
However, in the near future, given the current reality of the increasing use of cloud computing, the 
increase of SaaS-based electronic record control systems (Software as a Service) and, consequently, will 
be widely used to provide employees with the means to carry out their workday records.
This work also brings a new and current challenge for the expert to acquire, analyze and examine 
evidence focused on forensic cloud computing, which now involves, in addition to IaaS (Infrastructure as 
a Service), SaaS, more specifically in this work, the programs that will be in the cloud performing 
electronic point record control.
The results presented in this paper can be used to create or improve new tools, adaptations and even 
new norms or guidelines aimed at the development and validation of programs (software) for 
companies that only use the program for electronic point record of their employees.
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private void btnEnt1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
        {
            TimeRegistro = DateTime.Parse($"{DateTime.Now.ToString("dd/MM/yyyy")} 
07:59:55");
        }
private void Tempo_Tick(object sender, EventArgs e)
        {
            TimeRegistro = TimeRegistro.AddSeconds(1);
            lblHora.Text = TimeRegistro.ToString("HH:mm:ss");
        
            // Validações
            if (TimeRegistro.Hour == 8 && TimeRegistro.Second > 3 && 
btnRegEntrada1.Enabled)
         {
                btnRegEntrada1.BackColor = Color.Red;
                btnRegEntrada1.Text += " (Auto) ";
                btnRegEntrada1.Enabled = false;
                }
private void btnSai1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
        {
            TimeRegistro = DateTime.Parse($"{DateTime.Now.ToString("dd/MM/yyyy")} 
11:59:55");
        }
            // Validações
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            if (TimeRegistro.Hour == 12 && TimeRegistro.Second > 3 && 
btnRegSaida1.Enabled)
         {
                btnRegSaida1.BackColor = Color.Red;
                btnRegSaida1.Text += " (Auto) ";
                btnRegSaida1.Enabled = false;
               }
private void btnEnt2_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
        {
            TimeRegistro = DateTime.Parse($"{DateTime.Now.ToString("dd/MM/yyyy")} 
13:59:55");
        }
            // Validações
            if (TimeRegistro.Hour == 14 && TimeRegistro.Second > 3 && 
btnRegEntrada2.Enabled)
        {
                btnRegEntrada2.BackColor = Color.Red;
                btnRegEntrada2.Text += " (Auto) ";
                btnRegEntrada2.Enabled = false;
         }
private void btnSai2_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
        {
            TimeRegistro = DateTime.Parse($"{DateTime.Now.ToString("dd/MM/yyyy")} 
17:59:55");
        }
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                 // Validações
                  if (TimeRegistro.Hour == 18 && TimeRegistro.Second > 3 && 
btnRegSaida2.Enabled)
              {
                     btnRegSaida2.BackColor = Color.Red;
                     btnRegSaida2.Text += " (Auto) ";
                     btnRegSaida2.Enabled = false;
               }
63
About the Author
André Ruschel is a Researcher,  an  IT speaker, a Forensic Computer Scientist, a member of HTCIA (High Technology 
Crime Investigation Association), the author of the several books (MVP Microsoft Cloud and Datacenter Management), 
a specialist in interoperability and an inventor of ThinEco Cardboard Computer.
Malicious Mail 
Attachements
Scanning & Inspecting the attachments
Mail attachments like documents, spreadsheets, and PDFs (for example) may include malicious content 
and you should train your employees to not open mail attachments sent by unknown persons; in fact, 
they should ask IT administrators/security to help them scan the attachments with an updated 
endpoint-security product. If nothing malicious has been detected, your IT administrators/security still 
may have to inspect the content with other tools: after all, spending 15 minutes, on average, inspecting 
a document is better than losing your data (encrypted with advanced variant ransomware).
We will give some practical examples about mail-attachment…
Let’s consider this scenario: One of the employees of your company (the marketing department) 
receives an email from un unknown supplier:
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A large proportion of users across cyberspace are not properly trained (or not 
trained at all) to defend themselves against cyber-threats like phishing/spear-
phishing, that’s why cybercriminals mostly deliver their malware through 
malicious attachments. Also with social engineering techniques, mail messages 
received seem genuine and their mail attachments may seem clean (documents, 
spreadsheets, PDFs...), all this may deceive the user and lead him to download 
the attachment and sadly run the malware! In this article, we will demonstrate 
different techniques to let you download and safely analyze mail attachments.
by HADBI Moussa Benameur
If your employee has been well trained, he'll ask for help instead of opening the document directly. If 
not, he may open the document and launch or download a malware. We assume that he contacted the 
IT/Security department for security advice:
Inspecting the attached document (pdf inspection)
The IT/security department should download the document but if their endpoint security doesn’t 
recognize any threat within the received PDF attachment, they should inspect themselves the PDF 
document. Fortunately, there are plenty of tools that may help gather more information and one of 
them is: pdfid.py 
pdfid*: It is a Python based script that scans the pdf, looking for specific keywords. You can download it 
from ( https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/pdf-tools/ )
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/JS /Javascript: indicates if the pdf document includes a JScript, this may indicate that the document is 
malicious.
/AA , and /OpenAction, indicates if an automatic action will be executed when the document is opened 
(launch the JScript without user interaction), this also may indicate that you’re dealing with a malicious 
document.
To be sure about the action, you have to extract the JS script from the document and see exactly 
what the script is doing.
/URI Indicates URLs included in the pdf document: this may indicate that you’ll be invited to open some 
URLs.
Let’s investigate with the target URL; since there are no /JS and /Open Action, you can open the PDF 
file directly without clicking on any URLs, of course. But, if you’re still afraid, you can use: strings 
(command under Linux)
The command strings will search for any strings within the pdf (we aim to find the two URLs listed by 
pdfid.py before) and redirect all the matches to a text file: strings_inside.txt
We open the resulted file with any text editor, and search for the keyword “URI”.
And bingo! It is the URL.
Another alternative, you could directly pipe the result from the strings command to grep command:
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Note:  If you’re under WinOs, you could use the Strings utility from Sysinternals suite (https://
docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/strings).
Now that we’ve found the URL, we search for it in VirusTotal: this gives you the ability to search for 
suspicious files and also “URLs”.
Open in your browser: virus-total.com
Enter the suspicious URL, and search for any match:
67
And voila!
For more information, click on:
And look for the downloaded file section:
We understand that when you open this URL you’ll be invited to download another MS WORD 
document: It started with a phishing mail and now it is a Drive-by-Download attack! We know for sure 
that someone is trying to infect your company, and we shouldn’t open any attachment. 
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You should be aware that VirusTotal may not include any information about your URLs/File.
Let’s do another scenario: We assume the employee didn’t call the security department and opened 
that URL, then the MS Word document is saved on his host machine: What would happen if the user 
will open the Word document? 
Inspecting the MS Document:
You should proceed carefully with MS Word documents; they may contain macros that execute 
some malicious script, or may download some other payload from a remote server.
Before analyzing the downloaded Word document, we’ll analyze another PDF attachment 
(invoice1.pdf) just to show you how to proceed when you deal with PDF that contains /JS & /AA, and 
again we use the Python script: pdfid 
This time, we have something else: 
When you open the PDF document (/OpenAction 1) there’ll be an action performed by the script (/
JavaScript 3), which may extract an (/EmbeddedFile 1) 
To inspect the PDF more closely, we use another Python script:  peepdf.py (http://eternal-todo.com/
tools/peepdf-pdf-analysis-tool)
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You should type: peepdf –i your_pd_file.pdf , to enable the interactive mode!
Let’s dissect the behavior of this pdf file!
As you can see, when you open the document (/OpenAction) will be triggered and the object 12 is 
“called”, let’s check what it’s about, type in the console: object 12
OpenAction has a reference to another object; to find where it resides use the command: search 
kkkllsslll
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We inspected before the object 12, let’s check this time the object 4.
Again use the command: object xx {xx is the number of the object}
By using alternatively the two commands object & search, you can learn more about the functionality 
of the scripts contained within your PDF, and sometimes you’ve to “guess” and not read all the code.
In our case, the script within the PDF file will launch another file “465CETOI2KJ366.docm”  
But where is this file stored?
Always within the peepdf console type: info, and look for embedded files.
You can then type on the console: info xx {xx the number of object} 
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This embedded object has a size of 51Kb so we should be very suspicious now: this may contain a 
malicious content. 
Time to extract this object from the PDF attachment. We’ll use another Python utility: pdfparser
-o 2 (The number of objects to extract, in our case 2)
-f Applies a filter to the object ( /FlateDecode for our embedded file ) 
-d xxxxx.doc (dump the stream of object 2 to a target file: suspicious.docm)
This will produce the file suspicious.docm, which we will check with the Linux command file:
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You should ask yourself: 
Why is a Word document embedded within a pdf document?  
Let’s inspect our “potential” malicious document with another utility: olevba (https://github.com/
decalage2/oletools/wiki/olevba)
Run the command: olevba –a suspicious.docm
{-a : To display only the analysis without displaying the VBA-Macro}
The summary gives us a “big picture” of the behavior of the malicious word document:
1. When the user opens the document, a script will be run
2. This script will download a file from the internet (the payload)
3. The payload will be saved somewhere in the victim’s machines
4. The script will run the payload through rundll32.exe 
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You can also extract all the macro code, by using the option –c and dump the result to a text file: 
olevba –c suspicious.docm > macro.txt
Or, 
You can extract each part of the macro separately by using: officeparser.py (https://github.com/
unixfreak0037/officeparser)
This will extract (--extract-macro) all the macros existing on the “suspicious.docm” to the directory 
vbamacro (-o)
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1. The cybercriminal sends the malicious attachment to the victim,
2. The victim opens the malicious attachment,
3. The attachments invite the victim to click on a link,
4. The victim clicks on the malicious URLs,
5. A Word Office document is downloaded automatically on the victim machines,
6. When the victim opens the Word Office document, a macro is run automatically and malicious 
software is installed on the victim’s machine,
7. The attacker takes control of the victim machines.
The Shellcode case!
Until now we’ve seen how a cybercriminal through phishing (harpooning) could download malicious 
software and install this malware on the victim’s machine only with JavaScript or VBA macro, or through 
drive-by-download attack, but cybercriminals have other tricks and one of them is sending an 
attachment that contains a shellcode that exploits a vulnerability within the target system and it could 
be:  
• The web-browser or a web-browser plugin … 
• PDF Reader…
• Microsoft Office suite…
• Etc…
Dealing with shellcode isn’t an easy task even if there are tools that may help you identify malicious 
content; for example, you could use:
• OfficeMalScanner to scan Office documents (RTF, or DOC…) and find any shellcode signatures/
pattern matches 
• Peepdf can also help inspect your PDF attachment, after that you could extract the malicious content 
with pdf-parser for further analysis
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You could also perform a basic dynamic analysis by opening your document in a safe environment and 
monitor your system for any malicious behavior (network traffic, file system, registry, etc.).
Basic dynamic analysis
If you’re unsure about a mail attachment after examination with the techniques above, you could open 
it in an isolated environment, such as a virtual machine, and perform a basic dynamic analysis, which 
consists of opening the mail attachment and releasing “any evil code” hiding inside.
Tools like “procmon” from sysinternals (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/
procmon) could help you monitor:
• File activity: Files that could be opened, created or deleted by the “evil code” within your mail 
attachment
• Process activity: Processes that could be created by the “evil code”
• Registry activity: Register entries that are opened, created, or deleted by the “evil code” 
• Network activity: The malware within the attachment, could open a port –backdoor-, send some DNS 
queries, or download other malwares on the infected machine…
Let’s give it a try…
Run “procmon” and stop monitoring by clicking on (or CTRL+E): 
Then clear all monitored events by clicking on (or CTRL+A): 
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Before we can start, we should create a filter because procmon by default will monitor all system calls 
(thousands of events per minute), but in our case we focus our attention on EXCEL process (you could 
try any other process that launch when you open a mail attachment: pdf reader, Word, etc.):
To create the filter, click on (or CTRL+L): 
Next,
1. Click on the list
2. Choose from options Process Name
3. Type the process name to monitor (EXCEL.EXE in our example)
4. Click ADD 
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Next time when you click on capture (CTRL+E), procmon will monitor only the activity of the process 
EXCEL.EXE…
Now, let’s release “the evil code” and see what is happening behind the scene:
By default, Excel disables macros for security reasons (and you should never enable the content if 
you’re unsure about the mail attachment you’ve received) but since we’re running in a safe 
environment, we enable the content! 
If it’s a malicious attachment, you should see some weird activity, for example, in my case:
There is some network activity: The process EXCEL.EXE (in fact, it’s the malicious macro) is connecting 
to a distant server, and receiving something.
Next, there is some file activity: 
As you can see, the received content is saved in the disk with the name “forensic.sample”.
So, this is a simple example of basic malware analysis, but with real malware, you could monitor other 
activities like process creation, and registry interaction, etc., and with this “tactic”, you could rapidly 
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Obtaining your Certified 
Forensic Computer Examiner 
Certification- Tips and Tricks 
The International Association of Computer 
Investigative Specialists, otherwise known as 
IACIS, is a world leader in digital forensics 
training and offers one of the most sought-after 
certifications in the digital forensic world, the 
Certified Forensic Computer Examiner (CFCE).
Achieving the CFCE certificate is a process that 
can take close to six months and it is not one for 
the faint of heart. One friend of mine who 
received her CFCE before I did, told me to 
expect that on at least one occasion, you'll be 
sitting on your kitchen floor, crying and drinking 
from a bottle of wine. This was true for her. Me; I 
enjoyed a lot of whiskey during my days and 
nights working through the process.
The purpose of this article is not to scare you 
away from trying to get your CFCE, but rather 
educate the reader of the CFCE program how 
best to prepare for its process and be successful. 
I’ll bold little tips and tricks that will help you 
along the way.
To give you a little background on me, I come 
from a small police department in Colorado who 
didn’t have digital forensic capabilities in house. 
Because of this, we weren’t seizing digital 
evidence to help strengthen our cases. In my 
previous career, I worked in the Information 
Technologies field where I was a jack of all 
trades, master of none. 
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The purpose of this article is not to scare you away from trying to get your 
CFCE, but rather educate the reader of the CFCE program how best to prepare 
for its process and be successful. I’ll bold little tips and tricks that will help you 
along the way.
by Matt Beers, CFCE
Naturally, after becoming a police officer, my 
interest started to point me back towards 
computers and technology.  I started by joining 
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task force 
also referred to as ICAC. This allowed me to take 
various classes and it got me into a couple of 
forensic focused classes. I was hooked. I 
managed to build small capabilities on a budget 
(which may be another article someday) and 
started doing basic forensic cases. I reached out 
to a mentor at a neighboring jurisdiction and 
asked him what I needed to do next and he told 
me to get my CFCE. 
When I looked into attending the BCFE (Basic 
Computer Forensic Examiner) course in Florida 
for two weeks, I was really put off by the cost. 
This is a huge struggle for a lot of people and a 
lot of agencies, but this is one of the most 
sought after and prestigious certifications in our 
industry. If you are on any task forces that have 
money to give your agency for training or 
equipment, that might be a solution to the 
money problem for you. At the time of the 
BCFE event, I had no in depth digital forensic 
training (if I couldn’t find the file by a known hash 
set, I didn’t know what to do), I felt like I needed 
to start with the BCFE course. For those readers 
who have a strong grasp of the different file 
systems, your tools and looking at hex-
adecimal, you may opt to test for your CFCE 
through the external certification process 
where it isn’t necessary to attend the BCFE 
event. Check the IACIS website for pre-
requisites for the External CFCE process.
The BCFE course is a two week course hosted by 
IACIS in Florida, while also hosting several other 
advanced training courses. The BCFE training is 
intense. During this training you’ll be drinking 
from the fire hose, but they start at the basics of 
how to use the start menu and progress from 
there - I saw one person after the second day, 
politely close up his laptop, pack up his bag and 
never return. Just breath, you’ll make it through. 
You aren’t expected to have it all memorized and 
there are labs after class that you can attend if 
you wish.
When you attend the BCFE event as a student, 
you receive a backpack of goodies, you get a 
laptop computer (it isn’t amazing but it is more 
than sufficient to complete the CFCE testing 
process), a write-blocker, a USB 3.0 hard drive, a 
thumb drive and the training manuals. My class 
also received a one year license to Forensic 
Explorer and that was the main tool we used 
during the training.
I was bright eyed and bushy tailed when I got to 
Florida for the BCFE event. The weather was 
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warm, the hotel was beautiful, and I was so 
excited to start! My BCFE class was the largest to 
date and I signed up after they were sold out. 
They then allowed additional registrations. This 
was supposed to push my testing back to 
December, but by chance, I was moved to the 
June testing group. After two weeks of staring at 
hexadecimal code, byte sweeping and head 
spinning, I was really intimidated to start the 
testing process.
The CFCE Testing Process
Obtaining your CFCE requires the successful 
completion of two phases; The Peer Review 
Phase and the Certification Phase. 
During the Peer Review phase you are given four 
practical problems sets to complete in order. You 
are given thirty days to complete each problem 
set with 100 percent accuracy. During these thirty 
days, you will submit your answers to a coach to 
review. You coach will check the answers for 
accuracy and send you back your results. You 
then review and make corrections and repeat.  
The goal of the coach is to help guide you 
through the problem set to make sure you 
understand the learning points, but they aren’t 
going to answer the question for you. In fact, you 
may have a coach who will just tell you that it is 
wrong with no explanation. They want you to try 
to figure this out. During the Peer Review 
Phase you are able to use any tool and 
resource of your choice with the exception of 
talking to another individual who is not your 
coach. (Reddit, message boards, colleagues, 
etc., are completely forbidden to be used as a 
resource for figuring out the problems.)
The biggest piece of advice I can offer here is 
that within the first 10 days of a problem set, 
you need to have already submitted your 
answers to your coach at least once.
I heard a rumor from one of the coaches that 
after the first thirty days, 20% CFCE candidates 
in one of the regions had failed to complete the 
first problem set and therefore were unable to 
continue. I find this number to be pretty accurate 
because out of the five people I made friends 
with while at the BCFE class, three of them were 
unable to complete the entire process for various 
reasons. Each of these individuals were already 
working in the Digital Forensic world.
Your success will completely dependent on 
your time management and your dedication-
Are you only going to work on this during paid 
work time or do you want this bad enough that 
you’re going to give up your summer plans to 
ensure your success? Your coach during this 
process likely has a full time job, a family and is 
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also busy, but he has volunteered to coach. So 
get the answers to the problem set sent in early 
and fast. When your coach sends you back 
corrections, move heaven and earth to look at 
them and start making those corrections to 
get the problem set back to the coach as soon 
as possible. The more dedication you show to 
the process, the more dedication your coach is 
going to show to you. You can’t expect to 
submit your problem set for the first time on day 
twenty-eight of thirty and expect that within a 
few hours your coach will have corrections back 
to you. You also shouldn’t expect that any 
corrections you are going to make will take you 
less than three hours. 
I wasn’t paid work time to complete these 
problem sets. I have a family and I had to work 
patrol full time, every day off was spent in front 
of the computer looking at my manuals, looking 
at the screen and answering questions. Plan to 
dedicate about 30-40 hours of time to each 
problem set. This number may vary on your 
experience, but I feel like as someone who 
had close to zero experience and speaking 
with experience examiners, this is pretty fair.
Another hint - If you complete a problem set 
early, you can start on the next problem set 
before the allotted time for the previous 
problem has ended. So while you have thirty 
days for each problem set, you don’t have to 
wait four months to complete all the problem 
sets- because of this I was able to complete all 
four peer review problems in two months and 
move into the Certification Phase.
Once you reach the certification phase, you are 
on your own. You can no longer reach out to 
your coach asking for help or advice. The 
Certification Phase is made up of two “tests”. 
The first is a hard drive practical where you are 
given 30 days to answer various questions about 
a hard drive image. This is another reason to get 
through the Peer Review Phase quickly, so you’re 
able to retain and use the knowledge you gained 
and apply it to the Certification Phase. There is 
not much to be said about the hard drive 
problem other than it is similar to peer review 
but without the assistance of a coach and the 
questions are all completed through an online 
portal.
The hard drive problem was difficult and, at 
times, really stretched my digital forensic 
knowledge. Once you feel confident in the 
answers you have, you can submit the answers to 
your hard drive practical where it is immediately 
graded. You are required to get an 80% on the 
practical. This is pass/ fail- you don’t get to know 
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your score- you just know you got at least an 
80% if it allows you to proceed with the 
Knowledge Based Test.
The Knowledge Based Test is 100 questions, also 
online, of general forensic knowledge. You will 
be given 14 days to complete this test. After I 
completed the hard drive practical, I was pretty 
mentally exhausted. I had planned on taking at 
least a three day break before starting the 
Knowledge Based Test- but I decided to just take 
a look at the test to see what I was getting into. I 
guess when your mind is in the zone, it’s in the 
zone, and I had completed 69 of the questions 
immediately after submitting my practical test. 
Use your motivation and successes to keep 
you going- Don’t allow failure to be an option 
for you.
The written test, once submitted, is physically 
reviewed by a real person to give you any 
benefit of the doubt on answers; this can take 
several painfully long and stressful days before 
you hear if you passed and completed the CFCE 
process. But once you do hear back that you 
passed, you complete some paperwork and you 
have officially joined the ranks of us Certified 
Forensic Computer Examiner.
While the whole process seems extremely 
stressful (which it is), I have yet to complete 
something that has been so rewarding for me. 
After completing my process and having 
dedicated so much time and effort into it, I found 
myself somewhat lost and bored with all my 
newly found free time. So, I decided that I 
wanted to help others through this process. I 
quickly signed up to be a coach for the next 
testing cycle, which I am extremely excited 
about! I also have applied to go on staff with 
IACIS and hopefully teach some of these 
practices and principals at the next BCFE event 
in 2019. If I make it, I would love to meet any of 
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Digital Forensics and 
the Law
In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice sought 
to quantify the public's confidence with forensic 
science. One such study found that jurors trusted 
forensic evidence far more than the testimony of 
the police, eyewitnesses, or victims.
The public's blind faith has been reinforced by 
television and movies that depict forensic 
science as being both unlimited and infallible. 
The reality is that classic forensic practices 
originated in the field, far from labs and scholars, 
and was based on unproven assumptions. This 
stemmed from the need for investigative tools, 
outpacing the deployment of the peer reviewed 
science to validate those tools. The end result 
has been wrongful convictions based upon junk 
science that has been codified into case law.
For example, polygraphs have existed for nearly 
a century, have been at the center of high profile 
convictions, and are generally perceived as 
trustworthy by the public. This is inconsistent 
with the well-documented cases of subjects 
cheating the polygraph to produce their desired 
results, and the National Academy of Sciences 
determining Polygraphs to be unreliable, 
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unscientific and biased. Despite these facts, 
public confidence in this pseudo-science remains 
strong.
Fingerprint analysis had a similar origin. How-
ever, after a century of review and refinement, 
fingerprint analysis has become an accepted 
science. At issue is its high rate of false matches, 
primarily due to assumptions that must be made 
by the reviewing analyst.
In my specialty of audio-video enhancement and 
authentication, practitioners routinely apply 
judgment based assumptions and filters without 
an adequate level of training or peer review. My 
colleagues boast about how they just figure it 
out as they work. Unfortunately, the courts have 
accepted prior work from these "experts", so 
their unsubstantiated results continue to be 
unchallenged due to those precedents. This has 
resulted in a proliferation of flawed evidence 
being accepted as fact into the court.
In 2013, I testified in a case that centered around 
altered video evidence. This opinion was easy to 
prove because the manipulations were crude and 
obvious. Later that same year, I testified in a 
federal case where the hiring attorney was only 
given a subtly altered video during discovery, 
and then the opposing counsel sought a Motion 
for Summary Judgment due to our opinion's 
reliance upon that flawed video. While that 
decision was overturned on appeal, that 
manipulated evidence should never have passed 
through the court as legitimate evidence.
The unfortunate reality is that, among all legal 
cases in the United States, faulty forensic science 
is second only to faulty eyewitness testimony as 
the leading causes of wrongful convictions. 
There are serious and harmful consequences 
when faulty forensic science is able to reach the 
courtroom, and it is unreasonable to expect 
judges to possess the required expertise in each 
area of science to make that determination.
To avoid forming flawed opinions, analysts must 
test everything, and assume nothing. Un-
fortunately, video authentication testing was still 
in its infancy in 2013, and analysts generally had 
to accept the integrity of their discovery as fact. 
In response, scientists and practitioners of the 
Forensic Working Group developed a scientific 
approach to evaluate the authenticity of 
recorded multimedia files. This led to a suite of 
relevant peer-reviewed tests being compiled into 
a logical workflow called the Multimedia 
Authentication Testing form, or MAT for short.
The MAT provides a roadmap to assist the 
analyst in assessing key file metrics and 
characteristics, including hidden metadata. When 
86
the test results are compared to known case facts 
and established manipulation models, the 
analyst is able to form a fact based opinion with 
regards to the tested file's evidentiary trust-
worthiness.
For example, let's say that a case relies upon an 
audio recording with an incriminating admission, 
but the accused claims that the recording was 
edited after the fact. Only the interviewer and 
accused were present at the time of the 
recording so, rather than hoping for a favorable 
courtroom battle between testimony credibility, 
science can search for provable signs of content 
manipulation.
The Locard's exchange principle states that, "It is 
impossible for a criminal to act, especially 
considering the intensity of a crime, without 
leaving traces of this presence." Since the 
behavioral characteristics of microphones are 
well established, any tampering events such as 
stop-start, editing, resaving, speed changes, and 
muting should leave behind some measurable 
trace evidence.
For example, an audio recording may have 
captured a rhythmic sub-audible sound (e.g. a 
seemingly silent 60Hz electrical harmonic) which 
can be isolated and amplified. Any disruption in 
this otherwise predictable sound pattern would 
serve as compelling evidence of editing, and 
such a finding would negatively impact the 
credibility of all evidence originating through the 
same chain of custody. Favorable dispositions 
are almost always ensured when damaging 
evidence can be excluded and/or the opposing 
side discredited.
In one of my early cases, I examined a telephone 
recording that sounded natural. Upon a spectral 
view (frequency over time), I observed a shift in 
the background noise during the incriminating 
portion of the recording. Upon deeper 
examination, it became obvious that this portion 
of the recording had originated from a different 
audio file. At that moment, I felt like a super-
detective and my career choice was forever 
solidified.
Metadata within, or about, a tested file can aid in 
determining a file's origin and chain-of-custody. I 
remember a case where a plaintiff and 
eyewitness accused the defendant of initiating 
an altercation. The eyewitness even produced a 
corroborating video the following day. The 
mobile phone video appeared authentic, and the 
case was presumed obvious and self-evident.
Upon forensic inspection, I found that the 
recording's GPS metadata deviated from the 
incident address defined in the police report. 
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Opposing counsel responded with an article 
explaining how a GPS discrepancy can result 
from a lag in the phone's ability to receive 
updated GPS satellite signals. However, 
suspicion grew once I proved that the video's 
GPS coordinates matched the home address of 
the plaintiff, who happened to be a professional 
video editor.
Authentication testing has the capacity to 
identify the originating recorder's make and 
model, and can sometimes identify the specific 
uni t that made the recording. This i s 
accompl i shed through the ana lys i s o f 
compression tables, file metadata, comparison to 
recordings found in social media posts, and 
characteristics unique to the specific recording 
device. Such tests can be performed years after 
the fact, even when the original recording device 
has been lost or destroyed.
For example, photo response non-uniformity 
(PRNU) refers to the natural microscopic defects 
in the silicon wafer used to create a camera's 
imager. The relative position of those defects 
creates a complex and unique watermark that 
gets imprinted onto every recording made by 
that device. Because the defects within the 
imager can be represented by a relative pattern, 
PRNU testing is able to survive repeated image 
processing. This capability makes PRNU testing 
comparable to the identity analysis applied to 
ballistic markings and DNA profiling.
In ruling on the 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, the U.S. 
Supreme Court set the Daubert standard for 
evaluating the scientific credibility of an expert's 
methodology, in that it must: be generally 
accepted in the scientific community, have 
undergone peer review or publication, have 
been (or be able to be) tested, and have a 
measurable error rate.
PRNU was first accepted into the scientific 
community during the 2005 SPIE conference. It 
was subsequently published and peer-reviewed, 
which validated its error rate parameters. PRNU 
became codified in a 2011 Alabama case (United 
States of America v. Nathan Allen Railey) where it 
passed its first Daubert challenge, and was used 
to prove that the images in this case originated 
from the suspect's camera.
Some common examples of authentication 
methods that have been codified include 
analysis of browser history and cookies to retrace 
an individual's internet activity, prior cell tower 
pings to track a user's movement, vehicular 
infotainment systems to reconstruct how and 
where someone drives, and temporal Electric 
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Network Frequency (ENF) discrepancies in our 
nation's power plants to determine where and 
when a given audio recording was produced.
Having access to all this information raises an 
interesting legal question: Is the analyst 
committing a crime under the 1984 Computer 
Fraud & Abuse Act 18 USC 1030(a) simply by 
extracting this data? It is unlikely that the end 
user explicitly authorized the analyst to access 
this identifying data, as they may not even have 
been aware that such data existed. At best, the 
governing laws are vague and, using the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution as reference, the courts 
generally find that vague laws violate a citizen's 
right to due process. While this challenge has yet 
to be tested in Federal court, it serves as a 
reminder that science evolves faster than the 
legal landscape it serves.
Courts change slowly, and judges are reluctant to 
rule against legal precedent or to hear a 
challenge, even when those rulings are found to 
have been based upon faulty science. In 
response, attorneys are hiring experts to elevate 
their evidence, even when the integrity of that 
evidence was not in question. This allows their 
opening statement to include, "This case relies 
upon recorded evidence. Opposing counsel 
would prefer that you trivialize it during your 
deliberations, so they never had it tested. We 
had this evidence analyzed by an independent 
forensic expert, who concluded that the 
recordings in this case are authentic and 
trustworthy." This is an effective tactic that has 
become the fastest growth segment of my 
business. When authentication testing is 
neglected, it leaves the evidence in a vulnerable 
status.
An example of this was a restaurant slip-and-fall 
case where, in the absence of eyewitness 
testimony, the case hinged upon video clips 
exported from different surveillance camera 
views. Each video spanned a brief time period, 
and none of the clips captured the actual 
incident. Although the originating DVR model 
was known, the site's DVR unit no longer existed, 
nor did the original recordings that it had 
contained. At question was why the video clips 
missed the incident.
Plaintiff's expert dismissed motion detection 
recording as a possible source, because on-
going motion was observed as the video clips 
ended. The expert then determined that the 
event was not part of the exported video clips 
because of either selective video exporting or 
post-production editing.
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As a result, plaintiff asserted that the defendant 
had intentionally omitted incriminating evidence, 
engaged in evidentiary spoliation, and 
perpetrated a fraud upon the court. Plaintiff's 
expert had decades of experience, and an 
extensive CV detailing relevant training and prior 
testimony. On paper, this expert had no equal, 
and it came as no surprise that the court 
accepted their qualifications and opinions as 
fact. The problem is that prior training and 
testimony on any given subject does not 
guarantee a correct understanding of that 
subject matter.
As the rebuttal expert, I used the MAT method 
to prove that the video clips were trustworthy 
and had not been manipulated. I then use the 
visual contents of those videos to work 
backwards and define both the motion detection 
zones, along with their relevant pre-record/post-
record settings, all of which exactly matched the 
available setting options defined in the user 
manual for the originating DVR model. Next I 
proved that the calculated settings of each video 
clip validated the calculations from the remaining 
video clips. I then used the raw data within the 
opposing expert's report to fully validate my 
findings, and thus prove that the other expert's 
opinions were based upon unsubstantiated 
assumptions. The case settled favorably after my 
deposition.
Within the field of multimedia, remaining current 
across ever evolving technology is critical to an 
analyst's effectiveness. Until a test becomes 
Daubert compliant, the analyst must either apply 
some unverified assumption or apply the 
unverified test, the latter of which is generally 
favored since it is easier to defend in the 
courtroom.
The future is unlikely to resolve these challenges 
as audio and video recording equipment 
becomes more complex. Although numerous 
public and private organizations see the need for 
industry oversight, this is unlikely to occur due to 
their competing interests and those of the 
software vendors who want to protect their 
proprietary solutions.
Within my profession, the real gatekeepers are 
the forensic groups and the accredited 
certifications, as they require continued 
education and testing. If an expert has not been 
certified, or re-certified, within the last few years, 
their knowledge may be seriously outdated. The 
same warning applies to experts where their only 
recent qualifications are public speaking and 
lecture/workshop attendance, where they may 
have been texting, confused, or otherwise 
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disconnected from the educational content 
claimed on their CV. Right or wrong, it is often up 
to the attorneys to evaluate the case experts, 
and the opinions that they present.
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Internet of Things: 
Amazon Echo Forensics
Internet of Things (IoT), sometimes referred to as 
the Internet of Everything, is a network of IP 
(Internet Protocol) enabled devices; these 
devices connect to one another and the internet 
with the aim to bring the users convenience in 
their everyday lives. Examples of internet 
enabled devices, otherwise known as ‘things’, 
range from self-driving cars, smart watches, heart 
monitors, smart microwaves, smart locks, smart 
light bulbs, Amazon Echo and many more. 
In order for these devices to communicate 
effectively between each other and for better 
convenience, each device has a sensor 
embedded. 
There are many examples of how IoT devices can 
bring convenience to people’s lives; one 
example would be the use of an IoT enabled 
alarm clock, this device is constantly updating 
information about the weather and traffic all 
while you’re sleeping. This can provide the user 
with convenient information. 
For example, when there has been a car accident 
on your normal route to work, the IoT enabled 
device will update this information and reset 
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your alarm time from 7am to 6:30am to account 
for the extra travel time required to arrive at work 
on time. 
Another example would be the smart watch 
monitoring your heart rate; this could provide 
you with information about your health that you 
may not have known otherwise. An example of 
this is when an Apple Watch notified James 
Green that his heart rate was higher than normal. 
James then sought medical attention to discover 
he had a blood clot in his lungs; this information 
potentially saved his life.  
The aim of the internet-enabled devices is to 
help people; these are just two examples of the 
convenience and usefulness of IoT devices from 
everyday convenience to life saving information. 
There is an estimation that there will be 200 
billion connected devices by 2020. However, 
with so many devices available to users and with 
the change in data storage, are Digital Forensic 
Investigators equipped to deal with these 
devices? 
In this article, the focus will be on the virtual 
assistant Amazon Echo. Amazon is currently 
selling a range of virtual assistants. These 
include: 
• Echo Dot 
• Echo 
• Echo Plus 
• Echo Spot
• Echo Show 
The focus will be on the Echo device with the 
built in Echo voice recognition; this device is a 
virtual assistant that is a ‘cloud’ based service 
with many capabilities to help the user. These 
capabilities include voice interaction, music 
playback, setting alarms, purchasing items from 
Amazon, general enquiries and streaming 
information: this can include news, sports, 
weather, traffic updates and many more. The 
diagram below shows how Amazon Echo works:
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There are a number of steps taken for the 
Amazon Echo to work effectively for the user, as 
shown in the diagram above. Users of an Echo 
device usually have some knowledge of how it 
works, i.e. the user knows to give a command to 
the device, using the application on a phone or 
tablet and that the device will follow that 
command. However, detailed aspects of this 
diagram may be unfamiliar to users such as 
MQTT and AWS Lambda. 
MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) is 
a machine to machine or ‘Internet of Things’ 
connectivity protocol on top of TCP/IP. This is a 
publish/subscribe messaging transport. 
AWS Lambda is a platform created by Amazon 
as part of the Amazon Web Services; this enables 
users to run code without provisioning for 
applications. AWS provides a platform that 
scales automatically and bills users according to 
resource demand. 
As Echo is a cloud-based service, the requests 
and responses are stored onto the Amazon 
servers. The confirmation of this has been 
located via the Amazon Echo policy guide; this is 
where Amazon has stated: 
‘When you speak to Echo, a recording of what 
you asked is sent to Amazon’s servers so our 
systems for speech recognition and natural 
language understand what the user is asking and 
so can respond to your request’. 
Another question often raised to Amazon from 
their customers is whether Amazon is recording 
all of their conversations.  Amazon has 
responded to this with the following statement:
‘No, devices are designed to detect only your 
wake word EG: Echo. No audio is stored or sent 
to the Cloud unless the device detects the wake 
word’. 
The user activates the devices using a wake 
word; this can be ‘Echo’, ‘Amazon’ and ‘Alexa’. 
As the device needs to listen for these wake 
words, the device records 60 seconds of audio 
and stores it in the memory. However, this is only 
the most recent 60-second audio clip. Each 60 
seconds, a new audio clip is created and the 
previous audio clip is deleted. This information is 
stored locally and not sent to the cloud. 
Data on an Echo device ranges from material 
held locally, the use of an Echo application on 
the user’s mobile/tablet and data that is stored 
externally on cloud servers. With the knowledge 
of how data is stored when using the Echo 
device, the Digital Forensic Investigator will have 
to complete different forensic techniques to 
uncover any potential evidence. 
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With data held locally, if you looked inside the 
Echo, one of the components is a 4GB eMMC 
flash storage memory chip. eMMC (embedded 
Multi-Media Controller) is a storage chip that is 
built onto the motherboard of each device.  A 
Digital Forensic Investigator would need to 
retrieve the data stored on this chip ready for 
analysis. 
The investigator would first physically remove the 
chip from the Echo device and then use 
specialized equipment/software to extract the 
data for analysis. 
As mentioned previously, Echo is a cloud-based 
service; the ‘cloud’ refers to services where the 
files and data are stored on servers connected to 
the internet. This ultimately means the user does 
not store this data locally on their device but on 
an Amazon server. 
There are many benefits of cloud computing, but 
this can bring a range of challenges for Digital 
Forensic Investigators. With cloud computing 
becoming common practice, what does this 
mean for Digital Forensic Investigators if the 
majority of data is stored online and no longer 
locally? 
Due to the popularity of Cloud Computing, this 
has led to an increase and development of what 
is now known as ‘Cloud Forensics’. This means 
that a Digital Forensic Investigator can no longer 
retrieve all of the information simply by gaining 
access to the device. In order to retrieve all of 
the information, further steps are required, which 
present their own challenges. 
The Investigator also needs to complete 
Network Forensics.  Network Forensics works by 
analysing the computer network traffic for the 
purposes of monitoring data, information 
gathering, and evidence collection and intrusion 
detection. Due to the Cloud being a network, 
this method is very important in the evidence 
collection stage, especially as this is volatile data 
and it can be lost after transmission. 
With an Echo, the owner has to register an 
Amazon account or log in to an existing one, in 
order for the device to work effectively. If a 
Digital Forensic Investigator is unable to access 
the user’s account, the appropriate authorities 
can enforce the use of RIPA (Regulations 
Investigatory Powers Act) 2000 to ascertain the 
user’s Amazon account credentials for further 
detailed investigation.
RIPA (Regulatory Investigatory Powers Act) 2000 
is an act of parliament of the UK, which regulates 
how public bodies conduct investigations, 
surveillance and the interception of co-
mmunications to gather evidence. However, 
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section 49 of RIPA covers protected information, 
which states:
‘A disclosure requirement in respect of any 
protected information is necessary on grounds 
falling within this subsection if it is necessary
• In the interests of national security
• For the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime; or 
• In the interest of the economic well-being of 
the United Kingdom’. 
However, if the suspect does not present the 
information such as account credentials/
passwords voluntarily, then this can result in up 
to 2 years imprisonment or 5 years imprisonment 
for government or indecent image crimes. 
With the credentials of the user’s account, a 
Digital Forensic Investigator can gain a large 
amount of information that can assist them 
during their investigation from the application.
The Digital Forensic Investigator will do this by 
having an active internet connection and 
accessing the user’s account. Accessing a 
number of URLs will provide the investigator with 
a large amount of information. The URLs used to 
gather information are shown in the table below: 





The investigator could gain 
information relating to all the devices 
connected to the Amazon account, 
which can also provide further 
information about the device, such as: 
- Model type
- Serial Number
- Customer ID 
- Software Version




The investigator could gain 
information relating to all the credit/ 






This URL lists all the wireless network 
information that the user chooses to 
save to the Amazon cloud (This is set 
by default). This information can 
include the SSID (Service Set Identifier) 





This URL lists all the smart home 
devices connected to that Amazon 
account within the user’s home. This 







This URL will show the investigator the 
last 50 activities performed by the 
Echo device. 
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However, if the Digital Forensic Investigator 
cannot gain access to the credentials, then a 
different option would be to use a ‘Subpoena’. 
This can be issued if a party wants a person or 
organisation to provide him/her with certain 
documents or physical evidence. With Echo’s 
information being stored in the Cloud, there are 
times when the investigator, court or the 
defendant can request the recordings from 
Amazon’s servers for investigation, shown in the 
case study explained below: 
James Bates gave Amazon permission to hand 
over recordings from his Amazon Echo for 
evidence after he was charged with the murder 
of a man, Victor Collins, found dead in his hot 
tub in 2015. During his trial, prosecutors tried to 
use Bates’ smart home against him with 
information from the smart water meter to argue 
that a lot of water used after the death showed 
he was potentially hiding evidence, such as 
blood. 
Another example of the use of Amazon Echo 
devices in law enforcement was documented in 
November 2018. A judge in New Hampshire 
requested an investigation of an Amazon Echo 
device, believing it could hold the key to solving 
a double murder. Christine Sullivan and Jenna 
Pellegrini were both killed in January 2017. The 
housemate (Sullivan’s boyfriend) Timothy Verrill, 
was charged with first-degree murder. After 
Verrill pleaded not guilty, the judge ruled that 
Amazon had to hand over recordings taken by 
the device at the property as evidence because 
the device records snippets of information 
before the wake word activates the device. 
In some instances of the recordings required 
from Amazon, they have said: 
‘They won’t release the information without a 
valid and binding legal demand properly served 
on us’. 
IoT enabled devices continue to increase, this 
will drastically change how Digital Forensic 
Investigators complete investigations. With IoT 
devices collecting information, this could help 
investigators collecting evidence in a criminal 
investigation; this will result in Digital Forensic 
Investigators requiring a wide range of skills to 
deal with such a vast amount of equipment such 
as smart watches, drones, water meters, fridges, 
smart locks, healthcare equipment and many 
more. With the challenges of investigating all 
these devices, the Digital Forensic industry will 
continue to grow and provide challenges to a 
Digital Forensic Investigator. 
This article has focused on the IoT device 
Amazon Echo, with the forensic methods 
mentioned and how much data is gathered from 
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this device/application. From the two examples 
shown where the recordings are being used in 
courtrooms, there is currently high interest in 
what these devices can bring to a criminal case 
and how they can possibly convict the suspects if 
the evidence is located. There is definitely no 
doubt that Digital Forensics is about to change 
drastically with such a development in internet 
related equipment. If the industry and law 
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What is Live Forensic/Live Response?
A methodology that advocates extracting “live” system data before pulling the cord to preserve 
memory, process, and network information that would be lost with a traditional forensic approach.
Live forensic recognizes the value of the volatile data that may be lost by a power down and seeks to 
collect it from a running system. While performing a forensic investigation, it is important that we 
preserve the integrity of evidence and try collecting as much evidence as possible. Volatile data or RAM 
memory are very crucial evidence and can help us in many ways during our investigation.
99
This article will put some insight on basic commands and tools that can be used 
while performing Live Forensic. Data on a system has an order of volatility. Data 
from the Memory, Swap Space, Network Process and Running System Processes 
are the most volatile data and will be lost if a system reboots or powers down. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) released a document titled, 
Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving. It is also known as RFC 
3227. This document explains that the collection of evidence should start with 
the most volatile item and end with the least volatile item. 
by Nikhil Singhvi S
Further, this article will put some insight on basic 
commands and tools that can be used while 
performing Live Forensic.
Data on a system has an order of volatility. Data 
from the Memory, Swap Space, Network Process 
and Running System Processes are the most 
volatile data and will be lost if a system reboots 
or powers down. The Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) released a document titled, 
Guidelines for Evidence Collection and 
Archiving. It is also known as RFC 3227. This 
document explains that the collection of 
evidence should start with the most volatile item 
and end with the least volatile item. So, 




Data in CPU and registers are extremely volatile, 
since they are changing all of the time. 
Nanoseconds make the difference here. It can be 
flushed easily by performing a simple action by 
the computer. An examiner needs to get to the 
cache and register immediately and extract that 
evidence before it is lost.
2. Routing Table, ARP Cache, Process Table, 
Kernel Statistics, Memory:
The routing table and the process table have 
data located on network devices. In other words, 
that data can change quickly while the system is 
in operation, so evidence must be gathered 
quickly. Kernel statistics are highly volatile 
because it moves back and forth between cache 
and main memory. The RAM stays longer than 
other memory. However, it can be lost if there is 
a power spike or if power goes out. So, the 
information should be obtained quickly. 
3. Temporary File Systems:
Even though the contents of temporary file 
systems have the potential to become an 
important part of legal proceedings, the volatility 
concern is not as high here. Temporary file 
systems usually stick around for a while.
4. Disk:
We think that the data we place on disk will be 
around forever, but that is not always the case. 
However, likelihood that data on a disk cannot 
be extracted is very low.
5. Remote Logging and Monitoring Data 
The potential for remote logging and monitoring 
data to change is much higher than data on a 
hard drive, but the information is not as vital. So, 
even though the volatility of the data is higher, 
we still want that hard drive data first. Further, to 
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know the user logged in on to the system both 
physically and remotely we can use “PsLogged 
On” command. We will discuss this in the later 
part of this article.
6. Physical Configuration, Network Topology, 
and Archival Media:
These are the items that are either not that vital 
in terms of the data or are not at all volatile. The 
physical configuration and network topology is 
information that could help an investigation, but 
is likely not going to have a tremendous impact. 
Finally, archived data is usually going to be 
located on a DVD or tape, so it isn’t going 
anywhere anytime soon. It is great digital 
evidence to gather, but it is not volatile.
Basic Commands:
There are two main ways that we can transmit 
the data to the forensic workstation. The first way 
is to use “important command” of network 
administrators called netcat. netcat simply 
creates TCP channels. netcat can be executed in 
a listening mode, like a telnet server or in a 
connection mode, like the telnet client. You can 
start a netcat server on your forensic workstation 
with the following command:
nc –v –l –p 2222 > Name.txt
The -v switch places netcat in verbose mode. 
The -l switch places netcat in listening mode (like 
a telnet server). The -p switch tells netcat on 
which TCP port to listen for data. By using this 
command, any data sent to TCP port 2,222 on 
your forensic workstation will be saved to 
Name.txt. On the victim computer, you will want 
to run a command to collect live response data. 
The output of the command is sent over our TCP 
channel on port 2,222 and saved on the forensic 
workstation instead of the victim’s hard drive.
The data can be sent from the victim computer 
with the following command:
N a m e | n c 
forensic_workstation_ip_address 2222
You will have to rename the italicized keywords, 
such as Name, with the command you run to 
collect the live response data. Moreover, you will 
want to substitute the IP address of your forensic 
workstation where it says  forensic_ work- 
station_ip_address. After these commands have 
completed, you will press CTRL-C (^C) to break 
the netcat session, and the resulting file 
Name.txt will contain all of the data from the 
command we executed. A simple MD5 
checksum of Name.txt should be calculated so 




The volatile data of a victim computer usually 
contains significant information that helps us 
determine the “who”, “how” and possibly “why” 
of the incident. To answer these questions, you 
will have to collect data from the following areas 
on the victim machine:
System Date and Time:
This is the easiest information to collect and 
understand, but it is one of the most important 
pieces of information to the investigator and is 
easily missed. Without the current time and date, 
it would be difficult to correlate the information 
between victim machines if multiple machines 
were affected.
The time and date are simply collected by 
issuing the “time” and “date” commands at the
prompt.
The current time is: 10:24:26.78
The current date is: 04-11-2018
Current network connection:
It is possible that while we are performing our 
live response process, the attacker is still 
connected to the server. It could also be possible 
that the attacker is running a brute force 
mechanism against other machines on the 
Internet from this server.
You can view a machine’s network connection by 
using the netstat command. You need to specify 
the –an flags with netstat to retrieve all of the 
network connections and see the raw IP Address.
When you run the netstat command on the 
victim’s machine, you will receive the following 
type of information:
Active Connections:
Proto  Local Address          Foreign 
Address        State
TCP    0.0.0.0:80             0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:135            0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:445            0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:623            0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:5985           0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:12373          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:16992          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:47001          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49664          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
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TCP    0.0.0.0:49665          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49666          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49667          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49668          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49669          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49670          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49671          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49675          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:49676          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:58001          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:58002          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    0.0.0.0:65200          0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:53           0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:8898         0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:8899         0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:8998         0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:8999         0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:10001        0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 4 9 7 9 4 
127.0.0.1:49795        ESTABLISHED
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 4 9 7 9 5 
127.0.0.1:49794        ESTABLISHED
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 4 9 7 9 6 
127.0.0.1:10001        ESTABLISHED
TCP    127.0.0.1:49942        0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
TCP    127.0.0.1:50039        0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 0 3 9 7 
127.0.0.1:50398        ESTABLISHED
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 0 3 9 8 
127.0.0.1:50397        ESTABLISHED
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 0 3 9 9 
127.0.0.1:50400        ESTABLISHED
T C P    1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 5 0 4 0 0 
127.0.0.1:50399        ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:139      0.0.0.0:0 
LISTENING
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 2 5 1 
52.138.169.124:443     ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 7 1 3 
151.101.0.175:443      ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 2 5 1 
52.138.169.124:443     ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 7 1 5 
151.101.1.181:443      ESTABLISHED
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TCP    ip_address:50719    23.0.141.68:443 
ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 7 2 1 
151.101.0.175:443      ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 9 1 3 
103.229.206.39:443     ESTABLISHED
T C P    i p _ a d d r e s s : 5 0 9 1 5 
104.121.240.198:21    ESTABLISHED
TCP    [::]:80                [::]:0 
LISTENING
TCP    [::]:135               [::]:0 
LISTENING
TCP    [::]:445               [::]:0 
LISTENING
TCP    [::]:623               [::]:0 
LISTENING
TCP    [::1]:49940            [::]:0 
LISTENING
TCP    [::1]:55364            [::1]:55366 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    [::1]:55366            [::1]:55364 
ESTABLISHED
UDP    0.0.0.0:123            *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:500            *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:3544           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:3702           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:3702           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:3702           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:3702           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:4500           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5000           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5050           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5353           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5353           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5353           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:5355           *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:11546          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:12373          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:39999          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:58468          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:58469          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:59944          *:*
UDP    0.0.0.0:63703          *:*
UDP    127.0.0.1:53           *:*
UDP    [::]:123               *:*
UDP    [::]:500               *:*
UDP    [::1]:54949            *:*
UDP    [fe80::243b:edc:3f57:ff97%17]:546 
*:*
UDP    [fe80::6d82:d701:3f19:54d3%9]:1900 
*:*
UDP    [fe80::6d82:d701:3f19:54d3%9]:54948 
*:*
The bolded lines represent the active network 
connections. The additional lines are open ports. 
Because you know that your forensic workstation 
is at the IP address ip_address, you can ignore 
corresponding connections. After removing all of 
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the other extraneous data, we are left with the 
following interesting lines:
TCP    ip_address:50251    52.138.169.124:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50251    52.138.169.124:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50713    151.101.0.175:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50715    151.101.1.181:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50719    23.0.141.68:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50721    151.101.0.175:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50913    103.229.206.39:443 
ESTABLISHED
TCP    ip_address:50915    104.121.240.198:21 
ESTABLISHED
The first line is of victim’s workstation connecting 
to port 443, the HTTPS, on system ip_address. 
The last line is connecting to port 21, the FTP 
port, on system ip_address. So using this 
method you can identify the connection 
established from the victim’s workstation.
Open TCP or UDP ports:
If we look at the lengthy netcat listing shown 
earlier, all of the lines that are not bolded are 
open ports. One reason on how they can be 
helpful to us is that an open rogue port usually 
denotes a backdoor running on the victim 
machine. We realize that Windows opens a lot of 
legitimate ports during the course of doing its 
business, but you can weed many of them out 
quickly.
You can further examine the strange ports that 
are open on the machine using freely distributed 
tools like the following:
1. FPort
2. IP finger prints and so on
Now, I will be demonstrating how PsTools suite 
can be helpful during your forensic investigation. 
This tool can easily be executed using command 
prompt.
1. User Currently Logged:
During your live response, you could run 
PsLoggedOn, which is a tool distributed within 
the PsTools suite. This tool will return the users 
that are currently logged onto the system or 
accessing the resource shares. When you 
execute this tool on a victim’s workstation 
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without command-line parameters, you receive 
the following information:
PsLoggedon v1.35 - See who's logged on
Copyright (C) 2000-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Users logged on locally:
03-11-2018 16:42:02 Victim\Administrator
No one is logged on via resource shares.
2. List of files opened remotely:
You could run PsFile. This command shows a list 
of files on a system that are opened remotely, 
and it also allows you to close opened files either 
by name or by a file identifier.
3. GetSid:
You could run PsGetSid. This command allows 
you to translate SIDs to their display name. It 
works on built-in accounts, domain accounts, and 
local accounts.
PsGetSid v1.45 - Translates SIDs to names and 
vice versa
Copyright (C) 1999-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
SID for \\<account name>:
<SID name>
4. PsInfo:
PsInfo shows information for the local system. 
Specify a remote computer name to obtain 
information from the remote system. PsInfo relies 
on remote Registry access to obtain its data, the 
remote system must be running the Remote 
Registry service and the account from which you 
run PsInfo must have access to the HKLM\System 
portion of the remote Registry. You will get the 
following output.
PsInfo v1.78 - Local and remote system 
information viewer
Copyright (C) 2001-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
System information for \\<account name>:
Uptime: 0 days 19 hours 20 minutes 40 seconds












Processor speed: 2.7 GHz
Processor type: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7300U CPU 
@
Physical memory: 2 MB
Video driver: Intel(R) HD Graphics 620
5. PsPing:
This command implements Ping functionality, 
TCP ping, latency and bandwidth measurement.
6. PsKill:
Running PsKill with a process ID directs it to kill 
the process of that ID on the local computer. If 
you specify a process name,  PsKill  will kill all 
processes that have that name.
7. PsList:
This command lists the detailed information 
about processes. You will see the following 
output.
PsList v1.4 - Process information lister
Copyright (C) 2000-2016 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
Process information for <Account name>:
Name    Pid Pri Thd  Hnd   Priv    CPU Time    Elapsed Time
Idle        0   0   4    0     52    11:44:10.125    19:28:48.418
System  4   8 191 4428    168     0:08:00.890    19:28:48.418
smss      464  11   2   52    444     0:00:00.156    19:28:48.374
csrss      672  13  10  935   1940     0:00:06.484    19:28:40.405
wininit   772  13   1  140   1308     0:00:00.046    19:28:40.060
csrss      784  13  13  791   2484     0:00:32.015    19:28:40.055
services 860   9   9  719   5912     0:02:33.968    19:28:40.001
lsass      868   9  11 1723   9064     0:00:39.281    19:28:39.978
svchost  984   8   2   89   1588     0:00:00.046    19:28:39.767
8. PsLoglist:
This command shows the contents of the System 
Event Log on the local computer. Command line 
options let you view logs on different computers, 
use a different account to view a log, or to have 
the output formatted in a string-search friendly 
way.
9. PsPassword:
You can use PsPasswd to change the password of 
a local or domain account on the local or a 
remote computer.




This command is used to display the configured 
services both running and stopped on the local 
system. You will get the following output.
SERVICE_NAME: RetailDemo
DISPLAY_NAME: Retail Demo Service
The Retail Demo service controls device activity while the 
device is in retail demo mode.
TYPE: 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS








There are many more ways/tools to extract the 
data when performing live forensic. But while 
performing a forensic acquisition on a Live 
system, it is important that you don’t lose the 
integrity of data. Similarly, also try acquiring as 
much information as possible. Internet-based 
application servers will be harder for forensic 
examiners to physically collect. Additionally, 
Internet-based applications may generate 
diskless workstations, leaving the only evidence 
in physical memory. Finally, software vendors are 
starting to deploy a larger amount of software 
that securely deletes data because of identity-
theft concerns. In the near future, traditional 
forensics will become more impractical, and live 
investigations wil l become a necessity. 
Traditional methodologies are becoming 
somewhat obsolete. We will need to adopt a 
new way of conducting these types of 
investigations. While we have to be careful while 
touching the computer in order to prevent any 
changes, it is now obvious that there are times 
when an examiner must interact with a live 
computer in order to retrieve vital data. We 
should also be able to provide a reasonable 
reason in a court of law to the judge/jury on why 
we performed live forensic and should also 
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ActiveNon–Blind Tamper Detection Solutions
Active non–blind tamper detection methods (Figure D1) require the assistance of certain identifying 
traces that are either attached to or embedded into the content at the time of its creation (or later by 
an authorized individual). 
Please note that the methods illustrated in Figure D1 are sometimes also referred to as active non–blind 
integrity verification measures or active non–blind content authentication methods.
1. Overlaid Timestamp Analysis  
Overlaid timestamps are amongst the most primary defenses against content manipulation. An overlaid 
timestamp is a sequence of characters embedded onto the video frames that identify when a certain 
event occurred (and was subsequently captured by the camera), usually giving date and time of day, 
sometimes accurate to a small fraction of a second.
1.1 Limitations of Timestamp–Based Tamper Detection
Timestamp–based tamper detection is a very primitive solution to a challenge as elaborate and 
consequential as establishing the authenticity of digital videos, and while it may be considered to be a 
precursory method of authentication, its results must not be accepted as an absolute proof of content 
reliability, primarily because not only are timestamps prone to inaccuracies (which can occur if the 
internal clock of the camera is inaccurate, or because of failure to pay attention to daylight saving in 
countries where it is applicable), but they are susceptible to tampering as well (timestamps can be 
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superimposed from one frame onto another). Consider the illustrative examples of timestamp 
manipulation presented in Figure D2.      
Figure D2 Examples illustrating susceptibility of timestamps to conscious manipulation. (a) depicts an 
original frame with an accurate timestamp whereas (b) depicts a cropped version of this frame with the 
original timestamp pasted onto the cropped frame. (c) and (d) depict two different frames with identical 
timestamps. In this case, the frame in (c) is the one with the accurate timestamp whereas the timestamp 
on the frame in (d) is false. [Images courtesy of Hyun et al. 2013].
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(a) Original Frame                                                    (b) Cropped Version of the Frame
                  (c) Frame with Original Timestamp                                           (d) Frame with False Timestamp 
An example of timestamp manipulation can be found in Episode 1 of Season 2 of the TV series ‘How To 
Get Away With Murder’, where the characters manipulated the timestamp on a surveillance video to 
falsify the timeline of the events depicted in said video. 
Figure D3 An example of timestamp manipulation. (a) depicts a sample frame from a doctored video 
and (b) depicts the corresponding frame from the original version of the video. In the doctored video, 
some portion of the timestamp was eliminated by simply cropping the video’s frames. [Original video 
courtesy of ABC]    
As we can observe from these examples, overlaid timestamps are not impervious to manipulation. 
Therefore, relying solely on timestamps analysis for the task of content authentication is not prudent.
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(a) Sample frame from doctored video
(b) Sample frame from original video
2. Digital Signature–Based Tamper Detection 
A digital signature is an encrypted translation of a succinct representation of the data under 
consideration. It primarily consists of key information regarding the data and some kind of unique 
identification of the data producer in the form of a condensed bit–stream. Digital signature based 
tamper detection schemes operate by examining the pre–embedded signature in the content under 
consideration; any discrepancy in this signature is considered to be an evidence of tampering.
2.1 Limitations of Digital Signature–Based Tamper Detection
Although the digital signature technology has proved to be quite proficient for the purposes of content 
confidentiality and integrity verification, it is rendered ineffective in the content authentication domain, 
primarily because of the following reasons:
Digital signature schemes are computationally intensive and therefore suffer from scalability issues. 
While within a controlled environment, digital signature–based schemes can be effective for tamper 
detection, they do not adjust well to the necessities of a large–scale media domain.
The external security token that digital signatures rely on is quite easy to remove, which implies that 
such a technique will work only if preservation of this token is in the interest of all the parties involved 
(which is not the case when the possibility of content tampering exists).
Digital signatures are extremely fragile and even innocuous operations such as lossy compression, noise 
removal, contrast or brightness enhancement, color adjustment, cropping, geometric operations like 
rotation, and local changes to data (such as blackening out a logo) are capable of destroying or 
damaging the signatures.
Generation, verification, and deployment of digital signature–based content authentication schemes 
are not only time–intensive processes but they incur great costs as well. Both these factors impose 
severe restrictions on the practical feasibility of such schemes. 
Digital signatures rely heavily on the technology they are based on; in today’s age of transient 
technology, such techniques end up with a very short shelf–life.
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Based on these constraints, we can state that digital signature–based tamper detection methods do not 
possess the capability to meet the needs of a realistic forensic environment.
3. Watermark Analysis–Based Tamper Detection
The process of watermarking entails embedding content integrity information as well as unique 
identification of the content producer into the data content itself. Watermark analysis–based tamper 
detection schemes operate in a manner similar to digital signature–based schemes; any deviation from 
the norm in the appearance or characteristics of the pre–embedded watermark is considered to be an 
evidence of tampering.  
3.1 Limitations of Watermark Analysis–Based Tamper Detection 
Though digital watermarking technology has some utility in the copyright protection domain, its 
content authentication properties are very limited; it suffers from the following shortcomings:
Watermark analysis–based content authentication works for only those videos that have already been 
watermarked. This restriction, along with the fact that most digital cameras do not contain a watermark–
embedding module, leads to a very limited scope of applicability for such schemes.
Some watermarks have been shown to degrade the visual quality of the digital content.
A damaged watermark may not always be indicative of tampering; attacks such as collusion attack, 
uncorrelated noise attack, stir mark attack, mosaic attack, jitter attack, inversion attack, and echo–hiding 
attack, are known to affect the integrity of watermarks. Moreover, completely harmless content 
modification operations, such as lossy compression, noise removal, contrast or brightness 
enhancement, color adjustment, cropping, and local changes to data (such as blackening out a logo), 
also have a negative impact on the integrity of watermarks.
Watermarking techniques do not possess the ability to resist willful attempts to remove the watermark. 
Generation of a counterfeit watermark is also not a difficult endeavor.
Watermarking–based schemes do not allow for the possibility of independent third–party verification, 
since the only people capable of detecting watermarks are the content producers or owners 
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themselves. Such lack of independent verification may be unacceptable in certain sensitive situations, 
for instance, during a criminal trial.
All these shortcomings render watermark analysis–based methods ill–suited for the task of real–world 
tamper detection.
If you want to find out more about Digital Visual Media Anti-Forensics and Counter Anti-Forensics click 
here: https://eforensicsmag.com/course/dvm-anti-forensics-counter-anti-forensics-w34/
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